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Abstract 
The main theme running through these three chapters is that economic agents 
are often forced to respond to events that are not a direct result of their ac-
tions or other agents actions. The optimal response to these shocks will 
necessarily depend on agents' understanding of how these shocks arise. The 
economic environment in the first two chapters is analogous to the clas-
sic chain store game. In this setting, the addition of unintended trembles 
by the agents creates an environment better suited to reputation building. 
The third chapter considers the competitive equilibrium price dynamics in 
an overlapping generations environment when there are supply and demand 
shocks. 
The first chapter is a game theoretic investigation of a reputation building 
game. A sequential equilibrium model, called the "error prone agents" model, 
is developed. In this model, agents believe that all actions are potentially 
subjected to an error process. Inclusion of this belief into the equilibrium 
calculation provides for a richer class of reputation building possibilities than 
when perfect implementation is assumed. 
In the second chapter, maximum likelihood estimation is employed to test 
v 
the consistency of this new model and other models with data from experi-
ments run by other researchers that served as the basis for prominent papers 
in this field. The alternate models considered are essentially modifications 
to the standard sequential equilibrium. While some models perform quite 
well in that the nature of the modification seems to explain deviations from 
the sequential equilibrium quite well, the degree to which these modifications 
must be applied shows no consistency across different experimental designs. 
The third chapter is a study of price dynamics in an overlapping gener-
ations model. It establishes the existence of a unique perfect-foresight com-
petitive equilibrium price path in a pure exchange economy with a finite time 
horizon when there are arbitrarily many shocks to supply or demand. One 
main reason for the interest in this equilibrium is that overlapping genera-
tions environments are very fruitful for the study of price dynamics, especially 
in experimental settings. The perfect foresight assumption is an important 
place to start when examining these environments because it will produce 
the ex post socially efficient allocation of goods. This characteristic makes 
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Chapter 1 
Repution Building with Error 
Prone Agents 
2 
1 .1 Introduction 
Kreps and Wilson's (1982a) sequential equilibrium (SE) has become the stan-
dard equilibrium concept for reputation building models. Imperfect informa-
tion is the essential element of these models that allows the SE to make 
appealing predictions. This uncertainty allows agents to mimic other types 
of agents in order to mislead other agents, in other words, to strategically 
build reputations. Reputation building is in strong contrast to the equilib-
rium predictions under perfect information which are typically counterintu-
itive in these situations, such as the famous backward unraveling result in the 
chain store paradox. The models to which the SE has been applied generally 
assume that agents believe that all agents are able to perfectly implement 
their SE strategies. Under this assumption, certain actions will fully reveal 
the agent's true type, so that the continuation game becomes one of perfect 
information. So a single action can resolve the uncertainty that enabled the 
SE to make different predictions than the counterintuitive predictions of the 
perfect information case. 
The current work introduces a new model of reputation building, in which 
the perfect implementation assumption is relaxed. In this model, no action is 
seen as a perfect signal, so the model will remain one of imperfect information 
for any observed history. Imperfect implementation will enter into the model 
in the form of a belief by agents that every action is subject to an error 
process. The error process is assumed to take the following form: after each 
move by a player, nature intervenes with some small probability. If nature 
intervenes, nature will simply randomize over the possible moves at that 
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node. If nature does not intervene, the player's move is implemented. Other 
agents cannot tell whether nature intervened or not. The error process is 
assumed to be common knowledge. This model will be called the "error prone 
agents" model. The effect of this error process is similar to the introduction 
of imperfect monitoring in principal-agent models and repeated games, 1 in 
the sense that the imperfections make agents less willing to punish other 
agents when "undesirable" outcomes are observed because the link between 
observation and intended action is now uncertain. The difference between the 
two types of imperfections is that under imperfect implementation, agents 
also consider the possibility that they may accidentally take a suboptimal 
action in the future. 
Consider an example in which a creditor is expecting a payment from 
a debtor in the mail, but does not receive it by the deadline. It may be 
that the debtor honestly thought she had made a payment but she actually 
forgot, or maybe the check got lost in the mail. Another possibility is that 
the debtor had no intention of making a payment. The first two possibilities 
are quite similar from the creditor's perspective, but the third case is very 
different. The error process introduced above is an attempt to include the 
first two explanations of the missing check into standard reputation building 
models, where before only the third case was considered. Notice that even 
though there are very different explanations behind the first two examples, 
the model developed here will treat them as if they were the same. The 
first example rests on the fallibility of the debtor, and the second on a noisy 
1 See Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) and Kandori (1992). 
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environment. But in both cases, the debtor intended to make a payment 
and may be surprised to find out that the check was not received. It may be 
the case that the debtor knows she is forgetful or that the mail is unreliable, 
and thus would not be very surprised at all. The important point is that she 
intended to pay. 
In the error prone agents model, agents believe that their own actions 
are also susceptible to the error process. This specification of the error pro-
cess has the attractive characteristic that the perfect implementation model 
is obtained as the agents' beliefs about the potential for errors approaches 
zero. The resulting equilibrium provides for some interesting possibilities 
for reputation building. Consider the simple example above. Under perfect 
implementation, the creditor would likely contact a collection agency if the 
check is not received by the deadline. When imperfect implementation is 
considered, a debtor who had been dependable in the past may be granted a 
grace period, or sent a reminder, whereas a debtor with a bad credit history 
may not receive such leniency. The sequential equilibrium to the error prone 
agents model allows for this kind of distinction. 
A sketch of the calculation of this equilibrium will be presented in the 
body of the chapter (a detailed equilibrium calculation appears in the ap-
pendix) for a game studied by Camerer and Weigelt (1988) (CW, henceforth). 
CW is primarily an experimental investigation of the predictive power of the 
reputation building SE with the standard assumption of perfect implemen-
tation. Their model is analyzed to facilitate the use of their data for model 
testing. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief intro-
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duction to the reputation literature. The development of theSE for the error 
prone agents model is sketched in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 will conclude this 
chapter with closing thoughts and ideas for extensions of this approach. 
1.2 Reputation Building Literature 
1.2.1 The Sequential Equilibrium 
A classic reputation building problem is the chain store paradox. The chain 
store paradox involves a monopolist and a set of potential entrants. The 
monopolist sequentially plays a stage game against each of the potential en-
trants. The stage game starts with the potential entrant deciding whether 
to enter the market or not. If entry occurs then the monopolist has the 
choice of either acquiescing and sharing the market or fighting the entrant. 
The monopolist's preference ordering in the stage game is: no entry >- ac-
quiescence >- fighting. Entrants' preferences are: acquiescence >- no entry >-
fighting. The monopolist would like for no entry to occur, so she may fight 
early entrants as a signal to future entrants to stay out. 
However, the following argument shows the weakness of the logic leading 
to such a strategy. In a finite sequence of the stage games, the entrant in 
the final stage game will enter because he knows that the monopolist would 
rather acquiesce than fight and that fighting can have no important effect on 
reputation. Notice that this does not depend on any of the previous moves 
in the game. Since entry is expected in the final stage game, the monopo-
list need not be concerned with the reputation effects of her action in the 
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penultimate stage game. By induction, all entrants should enter and the mo-
nopolist should always acquiesce. This holds for any finite sequence of stage 
games. This unraveling result is intuitive for a small number of repetitions, 
but the backward induction argument starts to seem more tenuous as the 
number of entrants increases. Consider a forward induction argument under 
which monopolists would fight in early rounds in order to deter future entry. 
The early entrants will recognize that the monopolist may want to do this, 
and so they will not enter. This dichotomy between forward and backward 
induction is the reason these results are dubbed a 'paradox.' 
Kreps and Wilson (1982b) suggest that if entrants have a small amount of 
uncertainty about the monopolist's payoffs, then there exists a game theoretic 
prediction in which reputations can form and some entrants will not enter 
in the finitely repeated game. For instance, entrants may think that there 
is some possibility that the monopolist's marginal cost curve is downward 
sloping so that he would prefer to fight rather than share the market. This 
type of monopolist would always fight entry. Monopolists who prefer not to 
fight would be willing to fight early entrants to deter future entrants. As 
the game approaches the final stage game, monopolists have less to gain 
by fighting, so at some point entrants will decide to test the monopolist. 
This is the basic intuition behind this SE. Kreps and Wilson (1988a) define 
a sequential equilibrium as a set of beliefs and a set of strategies for each 
player satisfying the following conditions: (i) a player has some probability 
assessment over the nodes in her information set conditioned on observed play 
whenever action is required; (ii) these probabilities are consistent with the 
equilibrium strategy; and (iii) play at each information set is optimal given 
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future equilibrium behavior of others and the aforementioned probability 
distribution. The exact form of the SE for the chain store game will not be 
considered here as it is similar to the SE model of reputation building for 
the particular game to be studied throughout this chapter which shall be 
addressed shortly. 
1.2.2 Impe rfect Equilibrium 
Another equilibrium concept, the imperfect equilibrium (Beja 1992), employs 
an alternate form of uncertainty, but is also able to obtain an equilibrium 
that also avoids the backward unraveling result. In this model, rather than 
asserting that some agents are inclined to play one particular strategy (i.e. , 
always fight), it is instead assumed that agents have imperfect performance. 
Agents have in mind a particular strategy, but they sometimes fail to perform 
it correctly. The probability that a strategy accidentally gets played is in-
versely related to the potential loss the player would incur if it were adopted. 
The rationale for this is that players would ensure against costly mistakes. 
It turns out that for the chain store scenario, this characteristic greatly 
diminishes the impact of the entrants having a dominant strategy. Beja 
discusses a two period repeated chain store game. His result is that the first 
entrant should choose to stay out and the second should enter, at which point 
the monopolist will acquiesce. The reason the first entrant stays out comes 
from a consideration of the effect monopolist's first round strategy has on the 
second entrant's expected payoff. The second entrant has four pure strategies 
to choose from, given that the first entrant actually enters. These can be 
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denoted: {(e, e), (o, o), (o, e), and, (e, o)} , where "e" stands for enter, "o" for 
out, and the pairs are ordered so that these are the responses to acquiescence 
and fighting, respectively, by the monopolist in the first round. It is clear 
that (e, e) is the dominant strategy in this equilibrium, as it is in standard 
complete information setups. Nothing the monopolist does in the first round 
can change that. However, since the probabilities that strategies are selected 
accidentally depends on their relative costs, the monopolist must consider 
his effect on the error rates. If the monopolist were simply to acquiesce in 
the first round, it would be very costly for the second entrant to adopt (o, e) 
as compared to (e, o), so the monopolist would normally face entry when 
the second entrant errs. By increasing the probability of fighting in the first 
round , the monopolist can increase the chance that the second entrant will 
accidentally not enter because she will now sometimes fail to enter under 
(e, o), and because (o, e) is selected more often due to its relative increase 
in expected payoff. This scenario was based on entry in the first round, but 
given that the monopolist will fight with high probability, the first entrant 
will opt to stay out. The details of this obviously depend on the payoffs and 
on the specification of how the performances depend on the relative payoffs. 
The simplicity of this example shrouds the complexity that could arise 
when trying to analyze a multi-period repeated game with this technique. For 
instance, consider a three period chain store game. Entry is still dominant 
for the third entrant. To determine the monopolists's response to entry in the 
second period, we would need to consider the effect this would have on the 
performance of the third entrant. The third entrant , however, will have 64 
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pure strategies to consider, given entry in the second period.2 It is clear that 
this analysis quickly becomes intractable for multi-period repeated games. 
The equilibrium developed later in this chapter bears some resemblance to 
the imperfect equilibrium, although it was developed independently. It differs 
in that it is developed in an imperfect information environment, and that 
it greatly narrows the state space by allowing players to use an updated 
"reputation" to summarize past moves in the game. 
1.2.3 Camerer and Weigelt 
This paper is primarily an experimental paper. It is included with these 
theoretical works as a way to introduce the model to be used for the original 
theoretical work that is to follow. 
The model studied is a borrower-lender game in which a single borrower 
(entrepreneur or E-type) faces a sequence of eight lenders (bankers or B-
types) who must decide whether to grant the borrower credit or not. If a 
borrower does procure a loan, she must then decide whether to repay the loan 
or to default. Of course, if no loan is granted, the borrower has no choice to 
make. The stage game consists of a banker decision followed by a borrower 
decision if necessary. The outcomes of all previous stage games are common 
knowledge. Bankers like to make loans, as long as they are repaid, but they 
would rather refuse the loan than to have it go into default. Assuming that 
the stage game is only played once, a typical profit-maximizing entrepreneur 
2 There are three possible outcomes in the first period, and two possible outcomes in the 
second, given entry. Thus, we must consider 26 or 64 possible pure strategies for entrant 
three. 
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should prefer to get a loan, and then default over repaying or not getting it at 
all. This is what CW call an X-type entrepreneur. These entrepreneurs prefer 
repaying a loan to being refused credit. If only these two types of agents are 
present, and everyone believes that to be true, then the finitely repeated 
game is susceptible to complete unraveling like the chain store game. In the 
final period, an X-type should default if given a loan , because she prefers 
defaulting to repaying and there are no more stage games to be effected by 
this decision. So the final banker should refuse to lend , to avoid the default. 
Then in the penultimate period, the entrepreneur knows she will not get a 
loan in the next period regardless of her actions in any previous periods, so 
she may as well default. Backward induction implies that no banker will lend 
to the X-type entrepreneur. 
If bankers believe that there is some probability that the entrepreneur 
actually would rather repay than default , the sequential equilibrium model 
of reputation building predicts that some lending should occur early in the 
game. This new type of entrepreneur is called a Y-type. The preferences of 
each type of agent in this game are summarized below. 
Banker (B-type): repayment >- no loan >- renege 
X-type Entrepreneur: renege >- repayment >- no loan 
Y-type Entrepreneur: repayment >- no loan >- renege 
CW induced a given proportion of their entrepreneurs to have Y-type prefer-
ences in their experiments. By making this proportion common knowledge, 
they were able to investigate the SE's predictive power. 
The sequential equilibrium to the game studied by CW under the perfect 
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implementation assumption will not be considered in detail here because it 
is a special case of the SE to the more general model introduced in the 
next section. However, a good intuitive idea of the SE predictions for this 
model will help the reader to better understand the results for the more 
complicated model that follows. Even though the equilibrium developed later 
in this chapter is also an SE, and others do exist, unless otherwise specified, 
the term "the SE" will refer to the sequential equilibrium to this perfect 
implementation model throughout the rest of this chapter. This notation is 
adopted because this is the standard SE model considered in the reputation 
building literature. 
Once a banker sees a default, he knows that the entrepreneur is an X-
type, so he should not make a loan. (This is a strong implication of the 
perfect implementation assumption.) Early in the game, even an X-type 
entrepreneur will repay her loans to try to mislead future bankers into think-
ing she is a Y-type and continuing to lend her money. As the game's end 
approaches, default becomes more appealing to the X-type because there is 
not as much to gain by continuing to repay as there was in t he beginning 
of the game. Bankers recognize this, so they need extra assurance that they 
are facing a Y-type to keep lending. If both X-types and Y-types are act-
ing identically (always repaying) , then bankers learn nothing from seeing a 
string of repayments. To have a repayment serve as support for the bankers 
believing the entrepreneur is a Y-type, an X-type must play mixed strate-
gies that place positive probability on reneging. The later in the game, the 
more certain bankers must be that they are facing a Y-type for them to be 
willing to lend. Bankers will be indifferent following a repayment under this 
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mixed strategy, and can thus play mixed strategies which will support the 
mixing by the X-types. As the game progresses, X-types must repay less 
frequently so that if they do repay, it makes bankers more likely to believe 
they are facing a Y-type entrepreneur and continue to give some loans. The 
SE prediction is that there will be repaid loans for the first few periods then 
a mixed strategy equilibrium in which no loans occur following a renege and 
repayment is followed by more mixing ( "few" could be made more precise 
given information about the payoffs, number of periods and initial beliefs of 
bankers about what type of entrepreneur they are facing). 
1.3 The Error Prone Agents Model 
While this section is entirely theoretical in nature, the inspiration for it was 
a data concern of Camerer and Weigelt. For the first few periods in their 
borrower-lender game, the SE predicts pure strategies by all types of agents . 
Consider what a participant in one of the experiments would think about an 
observation that should never occur under the SE. If the participant knew 
the SE and assumed that everyone would play it, a deviation would com-
pletely dumbfound him. Of course, the SE does have contingency plans so 
that there are equilibrium moves even after an unexpected move. Is it rea-
sonable to expect a person, who is working under the assumption that all 
players are following the SE, to continue to play the equilibrium after he has 
seen a deviation? He observed something that should have never happened 
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according to his original beliefs. 3 It seems as though such a deviation must 
alter his belief structure in some manner. The SE to the error prone agents 
model has the characteristic that agents expect to see some out of equilib-
rium moves, and will respond optimally to these deviations by following the 
equilibrium. 
One could model beliefs about imperfect implementation in many ways. 
Given the relative success the SE seemed to have in CW, a relatively sim-
ple modification of the traditional belief structure was chosen. People still 
believe that others intend to follow a common knowledge equilibrium, but 
they sometimes fail to do so. It is as if with some epsilon probability, nature 
can intervene and randomize over the possible actions. Agents realize that 
this may also happen to them. The main goal of this research is to see if 
the introduction of a simple belief structure which accounts for these errors 
can improve on both the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the SE 
under the perfect implementation assumption. Unfortunately, full construc-
tion of the SE for this new model is quite complex, so only a sketch of the 
development of this equilibrium is given in this section. Those interested in 
a more detailed account should consult the appendix. 
3See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) for a good discussion of the observation of zero 
probability events. This paper shows the relation between perfect Bayesian equilibria and 
sequential equilibria. They also offer a refinement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
which is shown to be equivalent to the SE for finite games with finitely many types of 
agents. 
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1.3.1 Beliefs and Updating 
Construction of the new model starts with a belief, E, which is the frequency 
of intervention by nature. At any decision node in the borrower-lender game, 
there are only two options. It is arbitrarily assumed that nature picks be-
tween them with equal probability. So an agent assumes that with probability 
1 - t/2 their intended move will successfully be enacted because nature will 
not intervene with probability 1 - E and nature will intervene only to make 
the intended move with probability t/2. Consider the reputation building 
implication of a positive <:: If an entrepreneur is strongly believed to be a 
Y-type, a renege is likely to be interpreted as intervention by nature. This 
is mentioned just to fore-shadow one of the interesting characteristics of the 
new equilibrium, which is that it allows for reputations to be built that can-
not be destroyed with one action. In the absence of beliefs about errors, 
E = 0, the SE under perfect implementation is obtained and one renege is a 
definite sign that the borrower is not a Y-type. So a positive E allows for a 
richer type of reputation to develop. 
Entrepreneurs, both X- and Y-types, will only have beliefs about the 
error rates. For ease of exposition, it is assumed that this is a common belief 
among all agents, including bankers. Bankers will also have beliefs about 
whether the entrepreneur in the current setting is an X-type or a Y-type. To 
be consistent with CW, Pt will be the belief of the banker in the tth period 
that the current entrepreneur is a Y-type. Y-types most prefer to repay 
loans. The introduction of beliefs about errors will not alter this being a 
dominant strategy for them. That leaves only the bankers' and the X-types' 
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strategies to be calculated. 
Let Lt be the intended probability with which the banker in period t will 
grant a loan, and St be the intended probability with which an X-type will 
repay the loan. For E > 0, it will always be the case that bankers can update 
their beliefs about the entrepreneur using Bayes' rule. The probability that 
a Y-type will repay a loan in any period t is 1 - E/2, made up of the 1 - E 
probability of intending to repay the loan, and the E/2 probability that nature 
intervenes and repays. Similarly, the probability that an X-type repays is 
St(1 - E) + E/2. A banker in period t + 1 would then update her belief Pt 
after observing a repayment according to the formula, 
P PB t+l -
(1 - E/2)Pt 
(1- E/2)Pt + [St(1- E)+ E/2](1- Pt) 
(1 - Ej2)Pt 
1- E/2- (1 - Pt)(1- St)(1- E). 
(1.1) 
The superscript P B indicates that the entrepreneur paid the loan back in 
the previous period. Similarly, bankers can update their beliefs based on a 
renege by using 
P RN t+l 
(E/2)Pt 
(E/2)Pt + [(1- St)(1- E)+ E/2](1- Pt) 
(Ej2)Pt 
E/2 + (1- Pt)(1- St)(1 -E). 
(1.2) 
Of course, if no loan was granted in period t , then Pt+1 = Pt because no new 
information about the entrepreneur was obtained. 
The following theorem establishes that beliefs following repayment must 
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be at least as great as those following a default, and gives the conditions 
under which this relation is strict. 
Theorem 1.3.1 For any t , Pt~f 2: P/!;_.1"{. Furthermore, for any E < 1, 0 < 
Pt < 1 and St < 1, Pt~f > P/!;_.1"{. 
Proof: By way of contradiction, assume Pt~f < P/!;!(. (1.1) and (1.2) imply 
the following. 
P PB < pRN t+l t+ l 
1- E/2- (1 - Pt)(1- St)(1- E) 
(1- Pt)(1- St)(1- E)(1- E/2)Pt 
< 
E/2 + (1- Pt)(1- St)(1 -E) 
< (1- Pt)(1- St)(1- E)(E/2)Pt 
Since all of the terms on the left of this last inequality are probabilities, it is 
clear that the inequality cannot be satisfied. To support the second claim of 
the theorem, simply use a weak inequality in the contradictory assumption. 
The conditions of the second claim clearly violate the weak inequality. I 
Given a set of payoffs, the SE to the new model can be constructed. The 
parameters from CW's experiments in which 33 percent of the entrepreneurs 
were assigned to be Y-types will be used in this exposition. In these exper-
iments, X-types received a payoff of 60 francs for repaying, 150 for reneging 
and 10 if no loan was granted. Payoffs were stated in francs, which were to be 
exchanged for U.S. currency at the end of the experiment. Bankers received 
40 francs following repayment, -100 following a default, and 10 if they did 
not grant a loan. 
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In general, a banker who must decide whether to lend in period t, who 
shall be referred to as Bt, will have the following indifference condition: 
40Pt(1- E/2)- 100(€/2) + 40(1- Pt) [(1- E)St + E/2] 
- 100(1 - P t)[(1 - €)(1 - St) + E/2] 
which reduces to 
(1 - Pt)(1 - St)(1- E) = 3/14- E/2. 
10 (1.3) 
(1.4) 
If the left side of (1.4) is less (greater) than the right, then the banker would 
(would not) be willing to lend. 
It may appear from (1.3) that the banker is not considering the possi-
bility that he will make an error himself. Theorem 1.3.2 shows that when 
comparing the expected payoffs to two actions, one can ignore the possibility 
of an error affecting that particular action. 
Theorem 1.3.2 The probability of an error on the current move is irrelevant 
to the choice between the two available pure strategies. 
Proof: Let EP1 and EP2 be the expected payoffs to actually carrying out 
the two possible moves at a node, and assume EP1 > EP2 . The expected 
payoffs to intending to carry out these strategies would then be EP1 (1-E/2)+ 
EP2(E/2) and EP2(1-E/2)+EP1(E/2). Assume by way of contradiction that 
EP1(1-E/2)+EP2(E/2):::; EP2(1-E/2)+EP1 (E/2). Collecting terms results 
in EP1(1- E) :::; EP2(1- E) . ForE< 1 this contradicts the initial assumption 
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I 
1.3.2 P e riod Eight 
The SE to the error prone agents model is developed through backward 
induction. Each entrepreneur faces a sequence of eight bankers. Clearly, if 
an X-type receives a loan in period eight, they will want to renege, so 5 8 = 0. 
For 5 8 = 0, (1.4) simplifies to the following indifference condition for B8 , 
Ps = 11/14- f/2. 
1- f_ 
(1.5) 
Higher beliefs will lead to an intended loan, and lower beliefs lead to an 
intended refusal. B8 's strategies when indifferent will depend on the strat-
egy employed by X7 , so those mixed strategies will be discussed when X 7 's 
strategies are developed. 
1.3.3 P eriod S e ven 
Bs's indifference condition can be used to calculate mixed strategy equilibria 
for X-types to play in period seven. Two ways to satisfy (1.5) are: for 
P{'8 to satisfy it; and for P8RN to satisfy it. (It is also possible for B8 
to be indifferent following a refusal, but that is a very special case which 
will only be addressed in the appendix.) That is to say, B8 can be made 
indifferent following a repayment for certain values of P 7 , and following a 
renege for others. Each of these possibilities requires a unique 5 7 . The 5 7 
that leads to indifference following a repayment will be denoted by 8{'8 , 
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and following a renege by s!(N. S!(B is found by solving for the s7 that 
forces P{B , from (1.1), to satisfy (1.5). The closed form solution to this is 
not particularly enlightening, so it will only be presented in the appendix. 
This strategy basically corresponds to the mixed strategy SE under perfect 
implementation. Analogously, Sf!N is obtained by making Bs indifferent 
when she updates using P8RN. The X-type entrepreneur's strategies can best 
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Figure 1.1: X-type strategies for periods six and seven: E = .25 
Figure 1.1 graphs the X-type strategies for periods six and seven. The 
strategy for period seven is the thick, dotted curve that looks like a wave. The 
strategy for period six will be explained later. The Y-axis is the probability 
that the X-type repays a loan in period seven, S7 , and the X-axis is bankers 
belief that the entrepreneur is a Y-type, P7 . The strategies in the graph are 
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calculated forE = .25. For very low beliefs, there is no reason to repay a loan 
at all, because B 8 will see the repayment as being more likely an accident 
than an intentional action and will have no intention of offering a loan. For 
somewhat higher P7 , S7 starts to become positive. These are the levels of P7 
for which B 8 will be indifferent following a repayment given that a repayment 
was unlikely to have come from an X-type. The higher P7 becomes, the 
less strong a signal a repayment needs to be to invoke indifference. This 
upward-sloping portion of the curve is SfB. A renege for these values of 
P7 would deter B 8 from lending. To make an X-type indifferent between 
defaulting and repaying under this equilibrium mixed strategy, B 8 must mix 
in response to a repayment to equate the expected payoff from repaying to 
that of reneging and being refused a loan in period eight. The closed form for 
B 8 's strategy that satisfies this indifference is given in the appendix. These 
payoffs naturally must take into account the role of beliefs about errors on 
expectations. Eventually the curve reaches a point where S 7 = 1. For any 
P1 above this point, a repayment will cause B 8 to want to lend. As shown in 
Theorem 1.3.3, unless a repayment leads to indifference, an X-type cannot 
have a pure strategy to repay. 
Theorem 1.3.3 ForE > 0, s7 = 1 is an equilibrium strategy only if P{B J 
given that S7 = 1, makes B 8 indifferent. 
Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that S7 = 1 and B 8 will not be 
indifferent following a repayment. For S 7 = 1, (1.1) and (1.2) imply that 
P{B = P8RN = P7 . Given that B8 is not indifferent for this updated belief, 
Bs must have a pure strategy to either lend or refuse to lend. This will be 
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independent of X 7 's move. Since X 7 's action has no effect on the continuation 
game, X 7 should maximize short term payoffs by reneging. This contradicts 
the proposed equilibrium strategy of S 7 = 1. I 
Under perfect implementation, S7 levels off at one for all beliefs in this 
range. Theorem 1.3.3 eliminated that possibility. It turns out that the only 
equilibrium strategy for these values of P7 is Sf!-N. In this range, a renege 
will cause indifference, and a repayment will imply an intended loan. An 
interesting characteristic of this p7 which is the transition point from Sf8 
to Sf!-N is that it is the belief level at which Bs is indifferent . If x7 gets a 
loan and repays under Sf!-N, B 8 's beliefs will be updated to this particular 
transition point. It is always the case that Bt+l will be indifferent if Pt+l 
is equal to the Pt at which Sf8 = SfN = 1. This gives the peaks of these 
"waves" a meaningful interpretation. B8 will mix in response to a renege 
under Sf!-N so that the expected payoff is equal to the expected payoff from 
repaying and getting a loan in period eight. The higher P7 gets, the less 
an X-type needs to mock a Y-type to have a renege result in indifference. 
Finally, for very high levels of P7 , an X-type can have a pure strategy to 
renege and still expect to get a loan following a renege. 
1.3.4 Periods Six through One 
In period six, the same strategies are employed with mixed strategies re-
sulting from the indifference described by (1.4) under both P{8 and P7RN. 
However, there is an added level of complexity. For levels of P6 just below 
the level at which B 7 would intend to lend following a renege, there is no 
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mixed strategy available to B 7 that would support Sf!N as an equilibrium. 
Two new strategies will be introduced for this set of beliefs. Where all the 
mixed strategies of X-types previously discussed were supported by mixed 
strategies played by the banker in the very next period , these new strategies 
depend on mixing by the banker two turns in the future. For reasons that are 
apparent from the graphical representation of these strategies, these mixed 
strategies will be called StaG and the s:N•7 . 
Note from Figure 1.1, that as Sf/lN reaches zero, B8 is indifferent following 
a renege. But at this point, the X-type has a pure strategy to renege. So 
there is sort of a spare degree of freedom in that B 8 can play a mixed strategy 
in response to a renege which only needs to make X 7 prefer to renege. This 
degree of freedom will be used in the construction of StaG. Under StaG, 
a repayment will result in P7 being updated to the point where S!(N = 
0. A renege will cause beliefs to be updated so that a loan is expected in 
period seven and the strategy S!(B is followed. These mixed strategies should 
properly be written as functions of beliefs, for example, staG(P6)· The 
second new strategy is called s:N·7 because s:N·7 (p) = s!(N (p). The ability 
to support s:N·7 relies on the extra degree of freedom created by the situation 
when a renege causes beliefs to be updated such that s!(B = S!(N = 1. Again, 
a pure strategy leads to indifference by B 8 , so that indifference can be used to 
equate expected payoffs for the entrepreneur in period six. So X6 's strategy 
is much like the wave pattern seen for X 7 , but there is a little sawtooth for 
high levels of p6 made up of StaG and s:N•7 . 
Two new strategies corresponding to staG and s:N·7 are added each 
period. For instance, in period five, the X-type strategies from low values of 
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p, to high are (S = 0 sPB sRN sJOG sRN,6 sJOG,6 sRN,7 s = 0) So 
5 5 >5>5>5 > 5 >5 >5 ,5 • 
in period one, there are 16 possible strategies for an X-type entrepreneur to 
follow depending on the initial beliefs of the bankers. 
Figures 1.2 through 1.4 show the responsiveness of these strategies to 
c, which varies from 0.00 to 0.10 in the figures. The wave pattern is less 
pronounced for small c, as are the saw-teeth. For c > .291 , X 7 will never 
want to repay because the chance that B 8 will accidentally refuse a loan is 
too high. So if agents believe errors are prevalent, no mixed strategy can be 
supported. 
Pr(PBIX- type) 
Figure 1.2: X-type strategies for periods one through seven: c = 0.00 
1 .4 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced an equilibrium model of the borrower-lender game 
in which agents did not believe that all agents would be able to perfectly 












Figure 1.4: X-type strategies for periods one through seven: c 0.10 
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build strong reputations that could not be destroyed with only one action. 
This feature allowed agents with good reputations to be treated with leniency 
when an undesirable outcome was achieved, while at the same time making 
sure that an agent with a bad reputation would be punished for such an 
observation. 
A rather simple model of how agents fail to implement these strategies 
was introduced. This specification did reveal that relaxing the perfect imple-
mentation assumption can result in some interesting theoretical results and a 
much richer dynamical structure. Possible alternatives are to have the error 
rate be time dependent or to have it depend on the magnitude of the loss the 
agent would incur if an error did occur, as in the Beja paper. Another inter-
esting line of research would be to investigate the implications of a relaxation 
of beliefs about perfect implementation in infinitely repeated game settings. 
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1990) have already studied the effects of 
imperfect observability on the folk theorems. The main difference between 
imperfect implementation and imperfect observability is that in the former , 
agents consider the fact that they may accidentally take suboptimal actions 
themselves. The impact of the differences between these two approaches is 
an open question worthy of further consideration. 
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Chapter 2 




The previous chapter was a theoretical consideration of reputation building. 
This chapter is complementary. There is an expanding collection of literature 
which aims to empirically test the predictions of the sequential equilibrium. 
Rigorous statistical analysis of experimental data from these types of en-
vironments has proven problematic primarily because of the persistence of 
actions that should occur with zero probability according to the SE. The 
model introduced in the previous chapter lends itself to maximum likelihood 
estimation using the entire data set. This procedure is fairly general, and can 
thus be used to test the new model against various alternatives. It will also 
allow for a more efficient test of an empirical regularity found by Camerer 
and Weigelt. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces a few of the 
important experimental papers on reputation building. Maximum likelihood 
estimation of the error prone agents model and various alternate models is 
presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 will conclude. 
2.2 Reputation Building: Experimental Ev-
idence 
There is a vast literature regarding reputation building in experimental set-
ting. Isaac and Smith (1985) first started looking for predatory pricing in 
experimental markets, although they did not do so in an incomplete infor-
mation environment. The following papers all operationalize an incomplete 
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information environment in most of their experiments. The degree to which 
reputation building behavior is observed varies. 
2.2.1 Came re r a nd W e ige lt - Home made Priors 
Camerer and Weigelt test the consistency of their data with theSE prediction 
by concentrating on the predicted reneging and lending probabilities (they 
considered lending following a string of repayments and lending following a 
refusal of a loan, both of which have distinct SE predictions). Initially they 
consider two experimental designs, differentiated primarily by the percentage 
of entrepreneurs who are assigned Y-type preferences. They start with six 
experiments, three with a 10 percent chance of the entrepreneur being a 
Y-type, and three with a 33 percent chance. Across experimental designs, 
they found that the observed frequency of reneging was lower than the SE 
prediction. Although, they also saw that the reneging frequencies increased 
almost monotonically in all of their designs, which is a qualitative prediction 
of the SE. They found that lending frequencies were often supportive of the 
SE, but not without exception. One particular exception was that bankers 
occasionally lent after observing a default. This analysis does help to give 
us an idea of the power of the SE prediction, but it does not lend itself to 
testing the SE against the predictions of other hypotheses. 
One such hypothesis studied by CW is the homemade priors hypothesis. 
It simply suggests that bankers bring into the experiment a belief that some 
proportion of the entrepreneurs assigned X-type preferences will act as if they 
have Y-type preferences. This proportion is called the homemade prior. The 
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inflated beliefs imply that X-types can have lower probabilities of reneging 
because they do not need to boost beliefs as much as without the homemade 
priors, and can thus afford to have a repayment be a weaker signal. 
The addition of homemade priors will not qualitatively change the SE 
prediction; it will simply alter the timing of the switch from pure strategies 
to mixed strategies and the reneging probability in the first round of mixing. 
CW estimated the magnitude of the homemade priors by looking for the 
first period in which significant reneging takes place in their data. They 
then calculated the homemade prior necessary to make that period the first 
period of mixed strategies with the observed level of reneging. Notice that 
this estimation procedure only uses a small portion of the data. 
This caveat aside, they find the surprising result that for both of their 
experimental designs, the homemade prior is estimated remarkably close to 17 
percent. This is quite a striking result , so they ran another set of experiments 
in which none of the entrepreneurs were induced to beY-types. Even though 
the bankers had no idea that any entrepreneurs had ever been assigned Y-type 
preferences, CW again found that a homemade prior of roughly 17 percent 
gave them the best fit. The consistency of the homemade prior throughout 
these three sets of experiments is supportive of the hypothesis, though not 
conclusive due to the small amount of data on which it is based. Because 
the homemade priors are calculated from only one period's data, it may be 
that data from the other periods do not support this hypothesis. A method 
to estimate homemade priors which uses all of the available data will be 
presented in Section 2.3. 
32 
2.2.2 N e ral and O ch s 
Neral and Ochs (1992) experimentally examine the same game as CW, but 
they use a comparative statics approach to test the predictions of the SE. 
They start by roughly replicating one of CW's experimental designs. They 
then decrease the payoff to X-types for reneging. The change in payoffs im-
plies that under the SE, X-types' strategies should not change, but bankers 
should lend less often. They find that both of these predictions are contra-
dicted by their data. A homemade prior cannot resolve this violation of SE 
predictions. 
There are three main differences between the experiments here and those 
m CW. First, the stage game is only repeated six times in these experi-
ments, as opposed to eight in CW. Second, for sequences involving Y-type 
entrepreneurs, the experimenters automatically repaid any loans. Assuming 
the subjects believed that the experimenters would not make mistakes when 
doing this, the foundation of the error prone agents model crumbles. Just 
as when agents believe strategies are perfectly implemented, the only way 
a default could be observed is if the entrepreneur was an X-type. Finally, 
the entrepreneurs in these experiments faced one banker for six consecutive 
periods, as opposed to the CW setup where they faced a sequence of eight 
different bankers. Although it is not an equilibrium strategy, this seems like 
a change that would be likely to make the banker try to get repaid loans 
through forward induction. We could easily think of having a new type of 
banker who simply lends until a default is observed. A normal type banker 
would gain from building such a reputation. These authors were also gen-
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erous enough to provide their data for the analysis that follows. While it 
will provide a nice comparison to the CW data, it should be noted that the 
three differences in the experimental designs could have profound effects on 
subject behavior. Unfortunately, one can only speculate as to the effect of 
any particular variation. 
2.2.3 Jung, Kagel, and Levin 
Jung, Kagel, and Levin (1992) is an experimental study of the chain store 
game. In experiments with no experimenter-induced strong monopolists, 
they find no support for complete backward unraveling, as the theory would 
predict if agents truly believed all monopolists to be soft . In these experi-
ments, and in experiments where there were two types of monopolists, there 
was consistent evidence of reputation building behavior. However, persis-
tent deviations from the SE predictions were observed. Homemade prior 
formulations along the lines of CW would not explain the deviations. 
2.2.4 McKelvey and Palfrey 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) was an experimental study of yet another game 
with reputation building aspects, the centipede game. A full description of 
the game is not necessary for this discussion; it will suffice to note that in 
complete information models, the Nash prediction is for complete backward 
unraveling, just as in the previous games. The authors develop a sequential 
equilibrium to an incomplete information model of this game, where there 
is noisy play, as in the error prone agents model. The authors find support 
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for this model. Furthermore, they found a significant bias in agents' beliefs 
which is much in the vein of the Camerer and Weigelt homemade priors 
hypothesis. 
2.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
2.3 .1 The Likelihood Function 
The error prone agents model is suggestive of a maximum likelihood es-
timation procedure which will be employed to test the predictive powers 
of the standard SE, the error prone agents model, and variations on the 
homemade priors hypothesis. Some notation to describe this estimation 
procedure will now be discussed. Actions taken by the entrepreneur in a 
game are represented by s = (s1,s2, . .. ,sN) where St E {PB,RN} for 
t = 1, 2, ... , N, where N is the number of stage games in the repeated 
game. The bankers' actions are denoted b = (b1 , b2 , .. . , bN) where bt E {lend, 
refuse} fort= 1, 2, . .. , N. It is also important to keep track of the type of en-
trepreneur taking these actions, so let T E {X, Y} stand for the entrepreneurs 
type. An immediate problem with maximum likelihood estimation is that 
invariably the data includes numerous observations, (s, b , T) , which are as-
signed zero probability under the SE, with or without homemade priors. 
The likelihood function would then be zero for all the different experimental 
parameters and nothing would b e learned. Omission of the offending obser-
vations would result in the loss of information about how well the models are 
followed when out-of-equilibrium behavior is observed. Instead, the outliers 
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will be accounted for by estimating a parameter that is similar to the E of 
the previous section. 
This new parameter, e , is the probability that nature intervenes in the 
play of the game and randomizes over the available actions. Remember, E is 
the belief about the error rate. If a given model summarizes the data well, one 
would expect to see a low estimate of e. This term is much like the residual 
included in standard regression analysis. As an example of how this fits into 
the likelihood function, say in period four that the entrepreneur's equilibrium 
strategy is to repay with probability 54 , and the banker's equilibrium strategy 
is to lend with probability £ 4 . The likelihood of a repaid loan in that period 
would be [£4 (1- e)+ e/2][54 (1- e)+ e/2]. 
The inclusion of e into the estimation procedure presents the opportunity 
to estimate the homemade priors from the entire data set. For a given set of 
experimental parameters, say the proportion of entrepreneurs induced with 
Y-type preferences is Pr(Y) . The homemade prior, v, is the proportion of 
X-types believed to be acting as if they are Y-types. So in period one, the 
belief of the banker should be P1 = Pr(Y) + v[1 - Pr(Y)]. A maximum 
likelihood estimate of v for a given set of observations could be obtained by 
finding the ( v, e) for which the estimated likelihood is maximized. Before 
such analysis is considered, two more parameters will be discussed. 
The parameter c: , which is the common believed error rate, was introduced 
in the previous chapter. This parameter is only relevant when considering the 
error prone agents model. Although it is similar to e, the difference is very 
important. E is the believed error rate, and e is the actual error rate. They 
need not be equal, although it would be desirable from a rational expectations 
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point of view if they were. 
The final parameter also lends itself to tests of rational expectations. 
The homemade prior was introduced as a belief that bankers brought into 
the experiment about the behavior of some X-type entrepreneurs. One might 
wonder why people would have these beliefs. Perhaps it is the case that some 
X-types really do act like Y-types. The final parameter considered, y, is the 
proportion of X-types acting as if they had Y-type preferences. Only when 
an agent is an X-type does y effect the likelihood of a given observation. 
How this enters into a likelihood calculation is best understood through an 
example. The likelihood of a repaid loan by an X-type in period four is 
[£4(1- e)+ e/2]{ (1- y)[S4(1- e)+ e/2] +y(1- e/2)}. Soy corresponds to v 
as e corresponds to E. The parameters assigned Roman letters reflect actual 
behavior, and those assigned Greek symbols represent beliefs. 
The full model to be estimated has the following characteristics. Some 
proportion, e, of actions are subject to intervention by nature, in which 
case nature randomizes over the possible actions. Agents have a common 
belief, E, about how often nature intervenes. Some proportion, y , of X-type 
entrepreneurs act as if they have Y-type preferences. Agents have a common 
belief that some fraction of all X-types, v, will act as if they are Y-types. 
2.3.2 Mode l Specification and Hypotheses 
A number of models will now be formulated in terms of these parameters. 
The hypotheses are that each model best describes the data. The first model 
is the sequential equilibrium under the assumption that agents believe that 
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strategies are perfectly implemented, more formally, E = 0. As was previously 
discussed, agents do not always precisely follow the SE, so e must be allowed 
to be positive to prevent the likelihood function from always being estimated 
as zero. Model specification SEE allows for e > 0 but a large e might 
indicate a weakness of the SE. In any case, a rejection of SEE would be a 
rejection of the perfect implementation sequential equilibrium because the 
precise perfect implementation SE is nested in the estimated model. The 
sequential equilibrium with errors model (SEE) is specified below. 
SEE: e E [0, 1], E = y = v = 0. 
Camerer and Weigelt 's homemade priors hypothesis simply added home-
made priors to theSE. The next model, the sequential equilibrium with errors 
and homemade priors (SEEHP) , is an analogous extension of SEE. Likewise, 
it is a weaker statement than the CW specification. 
SEEHP: (e ,v) E [0,1] 2,E = y = 0. 
Consider one possible explanation for why people may have these home-
made priors, which is that they are not homemade at all. Perhaps people 
have these beliefs about X-types because the behavior of the entrepreneurs 
suggests that some X-types are acting as if they were Y-types, so the priors 
are rational in a sense. The SEE with rational priors (SEERP) is defined as: 
SEERP: (e, v, y) E [0, 1]3 , E = 0, y = v . 
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The three previous models did not allow for beliefs about the error rate; 
that is, they all required E = 0, but they did allow e > 0. If it is the case 
that erratic behavior is common, is it reasonable to assume people ignore 
this fact? There is a sort of internal inconsistency in each of the models 
above. The following models consider sequential equilibria where agents rec-
ognize that some observations may be errors, which has been introduced as 
the error prone agents model. The analysis here will be limited to beliefs 
about the error rate that are consistent with observed behavior. Agents with 
such beliefs will be called "rational error prone agents." The first model, 
the rational error prone agents model (REPA), allows rational beliefs about 
errors, but does not permit any X-types to act like Y-types or for anyone to 
believe that this may happen, that is, no homemade priors. 
REPA: (e,E) E [0,1] 2 ,e =E,y=v=O. 
The final hypothesis is that people are doubly rational in the sense that 
they have both homemade priors and beliefs about the error rate which are 
both consistent with observed behavior. This model is called the REPA with 
rational priors, or REPARP. 
REPARP: (e,E,y,v)E [0,1]4 ,e=E, y=v. 
2.3.3 Estimation Procedure 
The likelihood function is estimated by performing a global grid search over 
the entire parameter space. Given a particular parameter vector (e, E, y, v), 
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the likelihood function, C(e, E, y, v), is estimated as follows. As shown in 
the appendix, intended equilibrium strategies are mappings from the sub-
jective probability the banker assigns to the entrepreneur being a Y-type 
along with the observed history of play to probabilities of lending and repay-
ing. Once these mappings are known, all that remains is to track bankers' 
beliefs through each observation. Let Lt(Pt) be t he mapping from beliefs 
to intended lending probabilities1 and St(Pt) be the mapping to intended 
repayment probabilities for X-types. Y-types always intend to repay, regard-
less of Pt. Given an objective prior, Pr(Y) , which was announced by the 
experimenter, bankers' subjective prior is P1 = Pr(Y) + v [l- Pr(Y)]. This 
P1 maps to a strategy triplet (L1 (P1), S1 (P1), 1) . 
For a given observation, (s, b , T), first consider b1 . If b1 =refuse, then 
log C(e , E, y, v) is incremented by log{[l- L 1(P1)](1 -e)+ e/2} . Since no 
loan was granted, the entrepreneur could not move and bankers have no new 
information with which to update their beliefs, so the next step would be to 
consider b2 . If b1 =lend, then log C(e, E, y, v) is incremented by log[Ll(PI)(l -
e) + e/2] . Since a loan was granted, the entrepreneur must act. If the 
entrepreneur is an X-type, T =X, then log £ (e,E,y , v) is incremented by 
log((l- y){[l- S 1 (P1)](1- e)+ e/2} + y(e/2)) following a renege and by 
log{(l-y)[S1(P1)(1-e)+e/2]+y(l-e/2)} following a repayment. IfT = Y, 
1 Unfortunately, due to the complexity of this problem, this entire mapping could not be 
solved for in closed form. Closed form solutions were used for all of the X-types' strategies 
and the bankers' strategies when only the S{'8 and sf:N strategies were used by X-types. 
There was a strong suspicion that parameter values leading to strategies which would 
require estimation of the problematic portion of the likelihood function would not be the 
optimal parameter values. This suspicion was confirmed by using a very generous upper 
bound to the likelihood function in this problematic range. 
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reneging would add log( e/2) to the log-likelihood function, and repaying 
would add log(l- e/2) . It is important to note that the entrepreneur's actual 
type is only used for calculating the likelihood of the entrepreneur's actions. 
This information does not enter the calculation of bankers' strategies. In fact, 
the next step in the estimation procedure is to update bankers' beliefs using 
either P.fB or P2RN as given by (1.1) and (1.2). Using the strategy triplet 
implied by the updated P2 , log£( e, E, y , v) is incremented as above. This 
process is repeated for each of the periods, updating bankers' beliefs after 
each period. Then the next observation,(s, b , T) , is considered. This whole 
procedure is repeated for each observation in the data set. The resulting 
log-likelihood is then compared to previously calculated values to see if it is 
a maximum for any of the relevant restrictions on the parameters. Then the 
next point in the grid, representing a new set of parameters, is considered. 
This grid search process is computer intensive, especially when searching 
over the entire four dimensional parameter space. Since future work in this 
field will likely require consideration of larger parameter spaces, it would be 
nice to have a procedure to quickly estimate these more complicated models. 
The problem considered here represents a very nice test case for alternate op-
timization algorithms, because it includes estimation of unconstrained mod-
els as well as models under simple constraints, and the results for a careful 
grid search have already been obtained. A publicly available genetic algo-
rithm for optimization was employed for this purpose. The algorithm is 
called GENOCOP2 , which stands for GEnetic algorithm for Numerical Opti-
2 Copyright @Zbigniew Michalewicz. This program is available via anonymous ftp at 
unccsun.uncc.edu. See Michalewicz (1992) for a description of the algorithm. 
41 
mization for COnstrained Problems. This particular algorithm was selected 
because the C source code is publicly available, and it is written to easily 
handle linear constraints on the parameters. The results were very encourag-
ing. Nearly five-hundred sets of parameters were estimated for the different 
models under the many subsets of the data considered. In every case, the 
optimal parameters found by the genetic algorithm were indistinguishable 
from those found by the grid search procedure. When only optimizing over 
one or two parameters, both methods were very fast. The advantage of the 
genetic algorithm is that the CPU time required to estimate the optimal 
parameters increases linearly in the dimension of the parameter space, as op-
posed to geometric increases in computing time for the grid search. So when 
even larger parameter spaces are considered, the genetic algorithm approach 
will be far quicker. The very positive results here suggest that researchers 
may want to use such algorithms to perform some preliminary analysis of 
complicated models, before large amounts of computer time are spent on a 
costly grid search. However, there is no guarantee t hat the genetic algorithm 
will converge to the global optimum, so a grid search should eventually be 
performed to verify the accuracy of the model estimates. 
2.3.4 Data Sets 
Data from the Camerer-Weigelt and Neral-Ochs papers are examined. The 
CW data is further classified by experimental design; the most recognizable 
difference between these is the proportion of entrepreneurs assigned to be 
Y-types, or Pr(Y). This can take on three values, 0.0, 0.1 , and 0.33; these 
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designs will be referred to as CWOO, CWlO and CW33. Within each of these 
designs are two or three experiments. Neral and Ochs have two experimental 
designs, which they call cells one and two. The payoffs in cell one are identical 
to those in CW's Pr(Y) = 0.33 design. The payoffs in cell two are all the 
same except that the payoff to X-types for defaulting has been decreased. 
Cells one and two will be called NOl and N02. 
CW focussed their analysis on the final two-thirds of their observations 
from each experiment. So for an experiment in which the eight period game 
is repeated 90 times, they would focus on the final 60 repetitions. They 
conjectured that participants would just be learning the nature of the exper-
iment at first , and thus could not be expected to be in equilibrium. If this is 
the case, one would expect to see the models fit the early observations worse 
than they do the latter observations. The data from each experiment was 
partitioned into thirds to allow for testing of this conjecture. 
2.3.5 Estimates for Partitioned Data 
Tables 2.1 through 2.5 report the estimated error rates and log-likelihoods 
for each subset of the partitioned data sets under each of the six models, for 
a total of 360 model estimates. The conjecture was that in the early part of 
the experiments, subjects would be learning how to play the game and would 
consequently not be playing equilibrium strategies. One would not reject this 
conjecture from the results in these tables. Two indications of early learning 
would be higher error rates and lower log-likelihoods in the first part of the 
experiments than in the latter two thirds. Both of these conditions only 
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Table 2.1: MLE Results for Partitioned Data S~ts: CWOO 
Early Middle Late 
Experiment Model e log .C e log .C e logf 
Pooled Unconstrained .45 -439.0 .27 -358.6 .17 -290.2 
SEE 1.00 -543.4 1.00 -528.2 1.00 -524.7 
SEEHP .48 -444.1 .34 -367.5 .19 -298.0 
SEERP .46 -445.2 .32 -362.5 .18 -292.2 
REPA 1.00 -543.4 1.00 -528.2 1.00 -524.7 
REPARP .23 -489.0 .21 -363.4 .17 -290.9 
9 Unconstrained .62 -242.5 .43 -206.8 .19 -129.6 
SEE .96 -266.5 1.00 -259.2 1.00 -249.5 
SEEHP .64 -244.2 .45 -207.6 .23 -133.8 
SEERP .63 -245.0 .44 -207.0 .22 -136.1 
REPA .96 -266.5 .99 -259.2 1.0 -249.5 
REPARP .96 -266.5 .23 -216.1 .15 -133.7 
10 Unconstrained .25 -174.9 .12 -135.0 .08 -116.2 
SEE 1.00 -276.6 1.00 -268.9 .92 -273.8 
SEEHP .26 -177.4 .15 -143.6 .08 -116.2 
SEERP .25 -176.0 .13 -138.3 .08 -116.4 
REPA 1.00 -276.6 1.00 -268.9 .92 -273.8 
REPARP .17 -188.6 .13 -139.3 .07 -118.2 
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Table 2.2: MLE Results for Partitioned Data Sets: CW10 
Early Middle Late 
Experiment Model e log .C e log .C e log .C 
Pooled Unconstrained .25 -410.9 .10 -274.7 .11 -293.8 
SEE .32 -516.0 .09 -355.5 .13 -353.9 
SEEHP .28 -423.5 .10 -274.7 .14 -315.7 
SEERP .27 -425.4 .10 -276.8 .14 -311.0 
REPA .16 -543.0 .05 -363.6 .05 -350.8 
REPARP .20 -433.7 .08 -289.3 .09 .297.1 
6 Unconstrained .14 -108.0 .03 -62.1 .04 -58.0 
SEE .17 -159.1 .04 -113.4 .05 -118.6 
SEEHP .15 -109.6 .05 -66.2 .05 -58.2 
SEERP .15 -111.5 .04 -63.9 .04 -63.5 
REPA .16 -168.8 .04 -113.4 .05 -118.6 
REPARP .10 -118.6 .02 -64.7 .03 -67.1 
7 Unconstrained .38 -154.5 .16 -115.5 .20 -135.1 
SEE .44 -180.4 .16 -130.9 .24 -153.7 
SEEHP .39 -155.7 .16 -115.5 .27 -148.8 
SEERP .39 -160.2 .16 -115.8 .25 -147.2 
REPA .16 -199.5 .14 -141.3 .14 -160.1 
REPARP .23 -169.4 .14 -119.6 .15 -137.5 
8 Unconstrained .20 -131.0 .07 -72.9 .04 -55.0 
SEE .32 -169.1 .07 -105.9 .05 -70.3 
SEEHP .30 -145.0 .07 -72.9 .06 -56.6 
SEERP .26 -141.1 .07 -74.6 .06 -57.0 
REPA .16 -173.9 .05 -107.3 .03 -69.6 
REPARP .13 -134.1 .05 -76.2 .03 -55.5 
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Table 2.3: MLE Results for Partitioned Data Sets: CW33 
Early Middle Late 
Experiment Model e log£ e log£ e log£ 
Pooled Unconstrained .27 -485.5 .14 -367.9 .12 -369.5 
SEE .34 -561.4 .15 -379.1 .14 -397.4 
SEEHP .30 -494.5 .18 -373.7 .12 -375.6 
SEERP .30 -501.6 .14 -370.6 .12 -372.9 
REPA .17 -605.0 .05 -407.8 .08 -422.4 
REPARP .23 -505.3 .12 -375.7 .11 -385.0 
3 Unconstrained .25 -136.1 .10 -99.0 .10 -131.6 
SEE .27 -155.2 .11 -105.1 .10 -136.1 
SEEHP .25 -136.1 .10 -99.1 .10 -131.6 
SEERP .25 -138.8 .10 -99.1 .10 -131.6 
REPA .20 -149.6 .04 -112.9 .05 -144.2 
REPARP .22 -140.8 .08 -101.7 .08 -136.4 
4 Unconstrained .25 -153.4 .19 -132.0 .13 -145.0 
SEE .28 -181.5 .21 -134.0 .16 -157.0 
SEEHP .26 -156.4 .21 -134.0 .14 -146.4 
SEERP .26 -163.9 .20 -133.7 .13 -145.4 
REPA .12 -192.0 .12 -146.6 .09 -157.6 
REPARP .20 -166.2 .15 -135.0 .13 -153.8 
5 Unconstrained .32 -180.7 .12 -117.2 .13 -89.7 
SEE .45 -219.3 .12 -137.1 .15 -102.9 
SEEHP .39 -196.0 .13 -122.4 .15 -92.0 
SEERP .37 -194.0 .12 -118.2 .13 -90.0 
REPA .17 -247.6 .04 -146.8 .09 -110.4 
REPARP .23 -192.1 .10 -124.9 .11 -94.2 
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Table 2.4: MLE Results for Partitioned Data Sets: N01 
Early Middle Late 
Experiment Model e log£ e log£ e log£ 
Pooled Unconstrained .06 -248.0 .04 -181.2 .01 -179.4 
SEE .07 -295.5 .01 -203.6 .01 -189.0 
SEEHP .09 -265.6 .04 -181.2 .01 -184.2 
SEERP .08 -255.6 .04 -182.4 .01 -184.9 
REPA .04 -302.0 .01 -205.3 .01 -190.0 
REPARP .08 -254.8 .03 -183.7 .02 -184.4 
1 Unconstrained .06 -91.7 .03 -67.3 .01 -58.8 
SEE .10 -103.5 .03 -70.0 .01 -60.5 
SEEHP .11 -102.2 .03 -68.4 .01 -58.8 
SEERP .11 -101.5 .03 -68.4 .01 -59.0 
REPA .07 -100.6 .02 -71.3 .01 -60.9 
REPARP .14 -96.5 .03 -68.4 .01 -59.1 
2 Unconstrained .07 -74.9 .03 -58.3 .02 -57.8 
SEE .06 -99.5 .01 -66.9 .02 -62.6 
SEEHP .08 -77.5 .03 -58.3 .02 -62.1 
SEERP .07 -74.9 .03 -58.5 .02 -62.3 
REPA .04 -102.1 .01 -67.6 .020 -62.6 
REPARP .06 -75.9 .02 -59.0 .02 -61.9 
3 Unconstrained .02 -63.2 .00 -43.7 .03 -56.7 
SEE .04 -91.0 .00 -64.4 .01 -65.8 
SEEHP .05 -74.2 .00 -43.7 .03 -56.9 
SEERP .02 -65.9 .00 -44.5 .03 -57.1 
REPA .03 -92.0 .00 -64.4 .01 -66.0 
REPARP .02 -65.7 .00 -44.5 .03 -57.1 
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Table 2.5: MLE Results for Partitioned Data Sets: N02 
Early Middle Late 
Experiment Model e log .C e log .C e log .C 
Pooled Unconstrained .10 -383.4 .04 -273.7 .01 -243.8 
SEE .24 -675.8 .04 -481.4 .01 -391.8 
SEEHP .16 -411.3 .05 -275.6 .01 -258.0 
SEERP .13 -398.5 .04 -277.0 .01 -252.4 
REPA .04 -714.9 .04 -481.4 .01 -392.5 
REPARP .10 -386.7 .04 -280.2 .01 -252.2 
4 Unconstrained .11 -84.6 .00 -42.0 .00 -53.6 
SEE .13 -139.6 .00 -108.3 .00 -90.5 
SEEHP .12 -85.9 .00 -42.0 .04 -55.0 
SEERP .12 -86.6 .00 -45.6 .04 -57.2 
REPA .04 -142.1 .00 -108.3 .00 -90.5 
REPARP .10 -89.2 .00 -45.6 .04 -59.4 
5 Unconstrained .17 -111.9 .01 -65.3 .01 -62.2 
SEE .38 -185.9 .04 -111.4 .04 -109.4 
SEEHP .25 -127.4 .07 -75.3 .07 -73.3 
SEERP .20 -118.0 .06 -71.4 .01 -66.4 
REPA .12 -199.3 .04 -111.2 .03 -109.7 
REPARP .19 -112.1 .06 -71.9 .01 -66.3 
6 Unconstrained .05 -69.8 .09 -73.8 .00 -53.4 
SEE .15 -160.8 .06 -131.5 .00 -87.5 
SEEHP .09 -76.1 .09 -73.8 .00 -53.8 
SEERP .08 -82.6 .09 -75.9 .00 -54.0 
REPA .04 -166.4 .04 -132.0 .00 -87.5 
REPARP .07 -77.6 .07 -79.2 .00 -54.0 
7 Unconstrained .11 -93.2 06 -70.3 .02 -66.8 
SEE .28 -180.6 .07 -125.5 .02 -100.8 
SEEHP .17 -109.1 .06 -70.3 .02 -67.5 
SEERP .14 -104.3 .06 -72.0 .02 -67.4 
REPA .04 -185.9 .04 -125.5 .02 -101.2 
REPARP .09 -97.2 .05 -73.6 .02 -67.3 
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failed in 7 of the 120 triplets of model estimates shown in these tables. In 
comparison, at least one of these conditions failed roughly half of the time 
when comparing results from the middle data to those from late data. These 
results support CW's decision to concentrate on the final two-thirds of the 
observations, so the first third of the observations were omitted for all of the 
estimates in Tables 2.6- 2.10. 
2 .3.6 Results for Mode l Comparison 
Tables 2.6- 2.10 show the maximum likelihood estimates of each of the param-
eters and the likelihood function value under each of the suggested models. 
One note of caution: the sample sizes given in these tables are the number 
of sequences used from each experiment. For the CW data, this represents 
the number of eight-period repeated games analyzed. However, for the NO 
data, each observation is a six-period repeated game. Thus, one would expect 
lower likelihoods from the CW data than from the NO data for comparable 
sample sizes. 
One very striking result is the estimated error rate, e, in the Pr(Y) = 
.00 experiments. When no homemade priors were allowed, under SEE and 
REPA, the estimated error rate was equal to one, more than twice as large 
as it was under any of the other hypotheses. These models failed to describe 
the behavior in these experiments so badly that modeling each decision as 
a coin toss was an improvement over the models. This result emphasizes 
the importance of considering the estimated error rate. One could hardly 
say that either of these models were supported by this data, even if the log-
49 
Table 2.6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: CWOO 
Experiment Model e € y v log £ 
Pooled Unconstrained .23 .00 .38 .18 -657.2 
SEE 1.00 .00 .00 .00 -1052.9 
SEEHP .25 .00 .00 .20 -672.7 
SEERP .23 .00 .20 .20 -660.4 
REPA 1.00 1.00 .00 .00 -1052.9 
REPARP .21 .21 .32 .32 -662.1 
n = 127 
9 Unconstrained .31 .20 .23 .45 -358.0 
SEE 1.00 .00 .00 .00 -508.8 
SEEHP .36 .00 .00 .55 -359.6 
SEERP .34 .00 .40 .40 -365.0 
REPA 1.00 1.00 .00 .00 -508.8 
REPARP .23 .23 .47 .47 -365.0 
n =58 
10 Unconstrained .14 .00 .34 .17 -265.6 
SEE 1.00 .00 .00 .00 -544.1 
SEEHP .15 .00 .00 .19 -271.2 
SEERP .14 .00 .18 .18 -266.6 
REPA 1.00 1.00 .00 .00 -544.1 
REPARP .13 .13 .24 .24 -273.3 
n = 69 
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Table 2. 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: CW10 
Experiment Model e E fJ v log£ 
Pooled Unconstrained .10 .00 .17 .10 -589.8 
SEE .11 .00 .00 .00 -710.6 
SEEHP .14 .00 .00 .19 -604.0 
SEERP .14 .00 .19 .19 -602.4 
REPA .05 .05 .00 .00 -714.9 
REPARP .08 .08 .11 .11 -594.6 
n = 144 
6 Unconstrained .04 .00 .10 .30 -125.8 
SEE .04 .00 .00 .00 -232.1 
SEEHP .05 .00 .00 .31 -128.4 
SEERP .04 .00 .27 .27 -128.7 
REPA .04 .04 .00 .00 -232.0 
REPARP .02 .02 .23 .23 133.0 
n = 46 
7 Unconstrained .18 .00 .00 .09 -252.1 
SEE .20 .00 .00 .00 -285.5 
SEEHP .21 .00 .00 .09 -266.3 
SEERP .21 .00 .09 .09 -264.8 
REPA .14 .14 .00 .00 -301.5 
REPARP .14 .14 .10 .10 -260.0 
n =53 
8 Unconstrained .05 .03 .00 .10 -141.1 
SEE .06 .00 .00 .00 -176.4 
SEEHP .07 .00 .00 .10 -141.6 
SEERP .07 .00 .10 .10 -142.5 
REPA .04 .04 .00 .00 -177.7 
REPARP .05 .05 .10 .10 -142.0 
n = 45 
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Table 2.8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: CW33 
Experiment Model e € y {j log£ 
Pooled Unconstrained .13 .00 .32 .07 -738.6 
SEE .14 .00 .00 .00 -776.6 
SEEHP .14 .00 .00 .07 -750.1 
SEERP .13 .00 .07 .07 -744.6 
REPA .05 .05 .00 .00 -839.6 
REPARP .11 .11 .16 .16 -761.5 
n = 173 
3 Unconstrained .10 .00 .09 .07 -230.6 
SEE .10 .00 .00 .00 -241.2 
SEEHP .10 .00 .00 .07 -230.7 
SEERP .10 .00 .07 .07 -230.6 
REPA .05 .05 .00 .00 -257.1 
REPARP .08 .08 .13 .13 -238.1 
n = 62 
4 Unconstrained .18 .00 .38 .05 -283.5 
SEE .18 .00 .00 .00 -291.4 
SEEHP .18 .00 .00 .07 -286.1 
SEERP .17 .00 .07 .07 -283.9 
REPA .12 .12 .00 .00 -301.5 
REPARP .15 .15 .19 .19 -293.1 
n = 62 
5 Unconstrained .13 .00 .23 .20 -211.8 
SEE .13 .00 .00 .00 -240.2 
SEEHP .14 .00 .00 .21 -214.6 
SEERP .13 .00 .20 .20 -211.8 
REPA .05 .05 .00 .00 -257.6 
REPARP .11 .11 .18 .18 -219.4 
n=49 
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Table 2.9: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: N01 
Experiment Model e t fJ v log £ 
Pooled Unconstrained .01 .16 .00 .27 -367.7 
SEE .01 .00 .00 .00 -394.4 
SEEHP .01 .00 .00 .06 -381.1 
SEERP .01 .00 .06 .06 -381.9 
REPA .01 .01 .00 .00 -396.2 
REPARP .01 .01 .07 .07 -380.5 
n = 180 
1 Unconstrained .02 .07 .00 .13 -127.3 
SEE .02 .00 .00 .00 -131.0 
SEEHP .02 .00 .00 .06 -127.6 
SEERP .02 .00 .05 .05 -127.9 
REPA .01 .01 .00 .00 -132.3 
REPARP .02 .02 .08 .08 -128.1 
n = 60 
2 Unconstrained .01 .16 .00 .26 -122.2 
SEE .01 .00 .00 .00 -129.6 
SEEHP .02 .00 .00 .05 -126.6 
SEERP .02 .00 .05 .05 -127.0 
REPA .01 .01 .00 .00 -130.1 
REPARP .02 .02 .07 .07 -126.7 
n = 60 
3 Unconstrained .01 .11 .05 .20 -104.9 
SEE .00 .00 .00 .00 -130.9 
SEEHP .01 .00 .00 .11 -105.6 
SEERP .01 .00 .09 .09 -105 .9 
REPA .00 .00 .00 .00 -131.1 
REPARP .01 .01 .10 .10 -105.8 
n = 60 
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Tabl~ 2.1Q: Maximum Lik~lihoQd Ef.ltimg,t~s: N02 
Experiment Model e € iJ v log .C 
Pooled Unconstrained .05 .00 .17 .26 -536.2 
SEE .03 .00 .00 .00 -875.6 
SEEHP .05 .00 .00 .30 -541.9 
SEERP .05 .00 .24 .24 -536.6 
REPA .03 .03 .00 .00 -876.9 
REPARP .05 .05 .28 .28 -544.8 
n = 240 
4 Unconstrained .02 .00 .00 .27 -104.9 
SEE .00 .00 .00 .00 -198.8 
SEEHP .02 .00 .00 .27 -104.9 
SEERP .02 .00 .23 .23 -107.5 
REPA .00 .00 .00 .00 -198.8 
REPARP .02 .02 .23 .23 -109.5 
n = 60 
5 Unconstrained .01 .28 .42 .58 -128.6 
SEE .04 .00 .00 .00 -220.8 
SEEHP .07 .00 .00 .28 -148.7 
SEERP .06 .00 .25 .25 -140.4 
REPA .03 .03 .00 .00 -221.0 
REPARP .06 .06 .27 .27 -141.2 
n = 60 
6 Unconstrained .05 .05 .31 .27 -138.3 
SEE .03 .00 .00 .00 -222.7 
SEEHP .06 .00 .00 .33 -139.0 
SEERP .05 .00 .28 .28 -139.2 
REPA .03 .03 .00 .00 -223.3 
REPARP .05 .05 .27 .27 -138.3 
n = 60 
7 Unconstrained .07 .00 .00 .31 -143.9 
SEE .05 .00 .00 .00 -227.4 
SEEHP .07 .00 .00 .31 -143.9 
SEERP .07 .00 .23 .23 -145.0 
REPA .04 .04 .00 .00 -228.6 
REPARP .06 .06 .29 .29 -148.4 
n = 60 
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likelihood came out very high relative to other models. Fortunately, for the 
main hypotheses of interest , SEEHP, SEERP and REPARP, the error rates 
never approach that level. Remember that e = .20 implies that an observed 
action was not the intended action ten percent of the time. 
Another interesting observation is how low the estimated error rates are 
for the NO data. To show how pronounced this is, compare the CW Pr(Y) = 
0.33 results to those from NO Cell 1, where the payoffs are the same. The 
lowest estimated error rate for any model using the CW data is five percent, 
which is more than twice as large as the highest estimated error rate for 
the NO data, which is two percent. Furthermore, for all of the NO data, 
the error rate never exceeds seven percent for any of the models. As was 
discussed previously, there are too many differences between the CW and 
NO procedures to permit us to infer that any result such as this is due to 
one particular change. 
Also, comparing NO cell one results to results from cell two suggests 
that the theoretical models do not adequately predict the change in behavior 
caused by the change in payoffs. Notice that for all of the equilibrium models 
that allow for some kind of inflated prior (SEEHP, SEERP, and REPARP), 
no prior is estimated over 11 percent in cell one, but in cell two, the prior 
is never estimated under 23 percent . This indicates that the estimation 
procedure is using these inflated priors to compensate for some persistent 
deviation from the equilibrium predictions. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the estimated likelihood function under the con-
straints of the model SEEHP. The reported likelihoods are the inverse logs 
of the estimated log-likelihood per repetition of the stage game. This can be 
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Figure 2.1: Estimated Likelihood Function for SEEHP: CW33 Pooled Data 
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Figure 2.2: Estimated Likelihood Function for SEEHP: NOl Pooled Data 
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interpreted as the the probability that the model under the given parame-
ters would correctly predict the outcome of an arbitrary stage game. As the 
homemade prior, v, increases, one sees ridges in the likelihood function. Re-
call that as the initial beliefs of bankers increase, the start of mixed strategy 
play is pushed farther back in the repeated game. Thus, these ridges cor-
respond to the initial beliefs of the bankers reaching a level at which mixed 
strategy play is pushed farther back in the game. 
In order to illustrate the implications of these parameters on predicted 
behavior, a simple example of equilibrium play under the REPARP model 
will be considered, because this model uses all four parameters. Notice in 
Table 2.8 that when using the pooled data, € is estimated at 0.11 , which is 
close to the value of £ used to create Figure 1.4. Recall that these graphs 
were constructed using the payoff vectors for the Pr(Y) = .33 experiments. 
Table 2.8 shows that for the REPARP model, the homemade prior, v, is .16. 
This implies that the beliefs of the initial banker should be P1 = .33 + .16 x 
.67 ~ .44. Figure 1.4 shows that sl = s[?.N for this level of beliefs, and it is 
known that for beliefs higher than that at the apex of S1 , B 1 should always 
intend to lend. In the REPARP model, as in all of the other models, it is 
assumed that there truly is an error process. So while B 1 may fully intend 
to grant a loan, since e = 0.11, a loan will actually only be granted with 
probability .95. Additionally, if an X-type is moving, there is a chance that 
this X-type may be acting like a Y-type. Thus, the actual probability of 
observing a repayment is (1- :0)[(1- e)St(Pt) + e/2] + y(1- e/2). Lending 
and repaying probabilities adjusted for e andy will be placed in parentheses. 
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• If B1 does lend, X 1 should intend to repay about 93% (89%) of the 
time. 
- If X1 does repay it will lead to P 2 ~ .47 and an intended loan with 
probability 1.00 (.95) from B 2 because .47 is past the apex of S1 . 
* If B 2 does grant a loan, X 2 should play S!}N under which she 
should repay almost 95% (91 %) of the time. 
* If B 2 fails to lend, no updating occurs and P3 = .47 which is 
past the apex of S2 , so B3 should intend to lend with proba-
bility 1.00 (.95). 
- However if X 1 reneges, P 2 will drop to about .26 which corresponds 
to the apex of S1 , and B2 will play a mixed strategy, lending about 
29% (31%) of the time. 
* If B2 does lend, X 2 should play Sf8 and intend to repay with 
probability .75 (.76). 
* If B2 does not lend, no future banker should intend to lend, 
or intend to lend with probability 0.00 (0.06), unless some 
other banker does lend and the entrepreneur repays under 
some S{' 8 mixed strategy. 
• If B1 does not lend, P 2 = P 1 = .44 which is past the apex of S1 , so B 2 
should intend to lend with probability 1.00 (.95) . 
- If B2 does lend, x2 should play s!}N under which she should intend 
to repay 95% (91%) of the time. 
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If B2 refuses to lend, P3 = P2 = .44 which is past the apex of 5 2 , 
so B 3 should intend to lend with probability 1.00 (.95). 
2.3. 7 Hypothesis Testing 
Table 2.11 presents the likelihood ratio test statistics comparing each of the 
restricted models to the unconstrained estimates. Notice that the only model 
that ever fails to be rejected for pooled data is SEERP, which is rejected 
for three of the five pooled data sets. This evidence suggests that none of 
the models accurately describe the pooled data. This is not surprising given 
that SEERP, REPA and REPARP depend on agents' beliefs being consistent 
with observed behavior. One certainly should not expect beliefs to depend 
on behavior an agent has not observed, as is the case when pooled data is 
used. 
Table 2.11 shows that for the 15 individual experiments, at a five percent 
significance level, both SEEHP and SEERP could not be rejected in 11 cases. 
REPARP is rejected in 11 cases at a five percent significance level, but fails 
to be rejected 7 times at a one percent significance level. SEE and REPA 
are rejected for all but one experiment each. This strongly suggests that the 
inclusion of some sort of inflated belief by the bankers does improve the fit 
of these models. 
One may suspect that the flexibility created by having a number of free 
parameters in these econometric models is what is driving the positive results, 
rather than the reputation building structure.3 A naive model with myopic 
31 would like to thank Charles Plott for helpful comments regarding this issue. 
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Table 2.11: Likelihood Ratio Tests: Unconstrained vs Constrained 
-2 log-likelihood ratio 
Design Experiment SEE SEEHP SEERP REPA REPARP 
cwoo Pooled 791.4 31.0 6.4f 791.4 9.8 
9 301.6 3.2t 14.0 301.6 14.0 
10 557.0 11.2 2.ot 557.0 15.4 
CW10 Pooled 241.6 28.4 25.2 250.2 9.6 
6 212.6 5.2t 5.8t 212.4 14.4 
7 66.8 28.4 25.4 98.8 15.8 
8 70.6 l.Ot 2.8t 73.2 1.8t 
CW33 Pooled 76.0 23.0 12.0 202.0 44.8 
3 21.2 0.2t o.ot 53.1 15.0 
4 15.8 5.2t o.8t 36.0 19.2 
5 56.8 5.6t o.ot 91.6 15.2 
N01 Pooled 53.4 26.8 28.4 57.0 25.6 
2 7.4t 0.6t 1.2t 10.0* 1.6t 
3 14.8 8.8* 9.6 15.8 9.0* 
5 52.0 1.4t 2.ot 52.4 1.8t 
N02 Pooled 678.8 11.4 o.8t 681.4 17.2 
6 187.8 o.ot 5.2t 187.8 9.2* 
7 184.4 40.2 23.6 184.8 25.2 
8 168.8 1.4t 1.8t 170.0 o.ot 
9 167.0 o.ot 2.2t 169.4 9.0* 
*Not significant at 1%. 
tNot significant at 5%. 
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agents is constructed in order to investigate this conjecture. Assume that 
all types of agents play mixed strategies. These mixed strategies are fixed 
at the beginning of the experiment and do not change regardless of observed 
behavior. One may ask, what is the best fit such a model could produce and 
how does this fit compare with the previous results? Maximum likelihood 
estimation is employed to find the triplet of mixed strategies that maximize 
the estimated likelihood function for each data set. This model has more 
free parameters than any of the restricted models considered above. The fit 
of this model is much worse than all of the previously studied models except 
for SEE and REPA, which achieve mixed results relative to the naive model. 
This suggests that the reputation building models are capturing a lot of the 
dynamics observed in the experiments. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The results presented here give some support to the findings of Camerer and 
Weigelt , that by inflating the initial belief that the entrepreneur prefers to 
repay, the descriptive power of the sequential equilibrium can be improved. 
I say "descriptive," rather than "predictive," because the rejection of these 
models using pooled data suggests that the optimal adjustment to the priors 
will depend on the subjects in the particular experiment. 
The results are generally more in line with the findings of Neral and Ochs. 
There is evidence that some kind of reputation building is taking place, but 
the equilibrium models considered show no consistent bias when trying to 
explain the results of these experiments. 
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Chapter 3 
Price Dynamics in Overlapping 
Generations Environments1 
1This paper is joint work with Charalambos Aliprantis. It was published in Economic 
Theory in July, 1993. I am the first author. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This paper studies competitive equilibria price dynamics in overlapping gen-
erations environments. The environments considered consist of a single mar-
ket in which agents trade two commodities, a good and a numeraiTe. We 
consider two types of agents who need only be differentiated by their en-
dowments. One type is only endowed with positive supply of the numeraire. 
These agents shall be called buyers. The other agents start with only posi-
tive supply of the good. Naturally, these agents are the sellers. This market 
is considered over a sequence of discrete time intervals, or periods. In each 
period, a new generation is born. A new generation consists of a finite num-
ber of both types of agents whose endowments and utility functions will be 
summarized in generational aggregate supply and demand schedules. These 
agents are potentially active for a fixed but arbitrary number of periods, 
which shall be called a lifetime. 
The current work is primarily intended to be an extension of the model 
presented in Aliprantis and Plott (AP) [1]. AP presented a unique perfect 
foresight competitive equilibrium to a finite horizon OLG environment in 
which there was a particular type of parametric shift (an "opposing shift") 
and agents lived for two periods. They also presented experimental evidence 
of convergence to the competitive price. One important contribution of AP 
is the introduction of a framework in which experimentalists could study 
price adjustment in a dynamic setting. The overlapping nature of the en-
vironment partitions the transition from the old market parameters (supply 
and demand) to the new into discrete time intervals. This is in contrast to 
64 
the standard non-OLG experimental environments. This particular feature 
alone makes these settings very appealing for the study of price dynamics. 
The existence of a unique perfect foresight competitive equilibrium price path 
provides a natural baseline to which other models could be compared. Take 
a simple alternative, which is that the overlapping feature has no effect, and 
agents only trade within their generations. This will generally be ex post 
inefficient, but yet it is one of the many plausible sequences of temporary 
equilibria to this environment . Other sequences of temporary equilibria arise 
from various learning rules. 2 These will also be ex post inefficient. The unique, 
ex post efficient, competitive equilibrium is a natural baseline to which these 
models could be compared. 
Naturally, the extent to which the theoretical predictions of various mod-
els differ will depend on the parameters of the given environment. From an 
econometric standpoint, the most powerful tests of these models will arise 
from environments in which the various models give very distinct predictions. 
A method to calculate the unique perfect foresight competitive equilibria for 
a more general class of OLG environments is presented here with this goal 
in mind. One possible application of these results is an investigation of the 
sort suggested above where the parameters of the environment are carefully 
selected to distinguish between the predictions of the rival models. 
While this paper is an extension of the experimental literature, it is purely 
theoretical in nature and presents results that are of general interest. Anum-
ber of results that characterize the competitive equilibrium price path for 
2See Blume and Easley [2], Marcet and Sargent [3], and Marimon and Sunder [4]. 
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environments with finite or countably infinite time horizons are presented. 
These results primarily show a degree of stability in the equilibrium prices. 
Under the assumptions of a finite time horizon and a single exogenous para-
metric shift, a unique perfect foresight competitive equilibrium is shown to 
exist. The environments here differ from those in AP in two ways. First, 
agents in the AP model had lifetimes of two periods. Here, the model is 
expanded to consider lifetimes of any finite number of periods. The main 
consequence of this in light of the previous discussion of price dynamics is 
that the number of periods spent in transition from the old market param-
eters to the new is proportional to the life span of the agents. Increasing 
the lifetime thus provides a better environment in which to study the era of 
transition from old market parameters to new. Additionally, AP required the 
shifts in supply and demand to be opposing, so that an increase in demand 
would be accompanied by a decrease in supply. This restriction on allowable 
shifts is dropped in the current paper. 
The characteristics of this model which make it readily applicable to 
econometric investigation of price dynamics are the same characteristics that 
contrast this work with most of the overlapping generations literature. The 
most important difference between the model considered here and traditional 
OLG models is that our commodities are both non-perishable. This feature 
increases the possibilities for intergenerational trade, which is the driving 
force behind most of our results. Overlapping generations are not introduced 
in these environments to find contrasts with the standard Arrow- Debreu type 
results, but rather to facilitate the study of price dynamics in environments 
where standard results can be shown to apply. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 .2 describes the environments 
and the equilibrium concept. Section 3.3 gives a quick intuitive explanation 
of the results that will follow in the next two sections. Section 3.4 presents 
some results that characterize the competitive equilibrium price path for 
OLG models with up to a countably infinite number of periods. Finally, 
Section 3.5 shows uniqueness and existence of the equilibrium price path in 
a finite time horizon model with a single parameter shift. 
3.2 The OLG Model 
The OLG model under consideration has two types of agents: buyers and 
sellers. The lifetime of each new generation of agents consists of n periods, 
where n is fixed a priori. Thus, a buyer or seller born in any period x will be 
alive for periods x, x + 1, ... , x + n- 1. Agents can be active in the market 
during any of the periods in their lifetime, but not in periods before their 
birth or after their death. Agents born in period x will be referred to as the 
new agents of generation x. Consequently, in any given period x > n- 1 
only the agents of generations x- n + 1, x- n + 2, .. . , x are alive. 
The new buyers of generation x collectively have an aggregate demand 
function Dx(p). Similarly, the new sellers in period x have an aggregate 
supply function Sx(p). The characteristics of the new agents in period x are 
the pair of functions (Dx(P), Sx(p)). 
All agents are assumed to be profit maximizers. Profit maximization is 
the driving force behind the trading transactions. The use of supply and de-
mand functions and profit maximization stems from the genesis of this work 
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being in the experimental economics literature, where this is the standard 
formulation of economic environments. Before introducing the notation to be 
used throughout this work, we shall briefly address the connection between 
this formulation and standard utility maximization. A full exploration of 
this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. However, consideration of a 
very simple economy does uncover some important details of this relation. 
Consider a pure exchange economy, in which there are two commodities, 
XI and x2 . Suppose all agents' preferences over these commodities can be 
represented by a quasilinear utility function of the form, U(xi, x2 ) = XI + 
u(x2), where u is increasing and concave. Agents start with endowments 
(wi, w2 ), and prices are denoted (PI, p2 ). The agent's utility maximization 
problem can be written as 
Without loss of generality, let PI = 1. The optimum may be reached at a 
corner, characterized by either x 1 = 0 or x 2 = 0, or in the interior, where 
u'(x2) = P2· 
Consider a two agent economy in which both agents have a common 
utility function . The agents start with different endowments, (wi,b, w2,b) and 
(w1,5 , w2,5 ). Figure 3.1 depicts how there could be gains to trade between these 
two agents. The marginal utility with respect to x2 is downward sloping by 
the concavity assumption. The graph shows that the utility gain to b from 
acquiring an additional unit of x 2 , which is p(l), is greater than the utility s 
would lose from giving up a unit of x 2 , c(l). Both agents would be better off if 
g 
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Figure 3.1: From Utility Maximization to Supply and Demand 
b would trades some quantity of x 1 between c(l) and p(l) for one unit of x 2 , 
assuming b has adequate endowment of xl· (Remember that au I axl = 1.) 
Naturally, equilibration would require a trade of q units of x2 for p2q units 
of x 1 where p(q) = c(q) = p2 . These changes in utility can equivalently 
be viewed as inverse demand and cost functions, which are then used to 
construct the supply and demand functions in the adjacent graph. These 
graphs also show that one potential cause of a shift in supply or demand is 
a change in endowments, as is the case when changing w 2,b to w~,b causes a 
shift from D(p) to D'(p). It is clear that a change in tastes, as represented 
by the utility function , may also shift supply or demand. 
Henceforth, only the supply and demand formulation will be considered. 
Throughout this paper, both supply and demand will be expressed as func-
tions. Supply is assumed to be strictly increasing in price and demand is 
taken to be strictly decreasing. Continuity is also always assumed. All results 
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are easily extended to an alternate formulation using supply and demand 
correspondences and set notation. Such a formulation merely complicates 
the exposition without adding significantly to the economic content of the 
model. For this reason, the functional formulation is used throughout this 
paper. Alternate statements of all the major results could also be established 
for supply and demand that are weakly monotone, but this is omitted for 
the same reason. We shall employ the following notation. 
1. The new buyers in period x may buy (collectively) b~ units in period 
x, b~+ 1 in period x + 1, up through b~+n-1 in period x + n - 1. In other 
words, the trading actions of the new buyers in period x are completely 
described by the vector 
If Px, ... , Px+n-1 are the prevailing prices in periods x, . .. , x + n - 1, 
then by the profit maximization assumption, we must have 
Of course, profit maximization and perfect foresight necessarily require 
this to hold with equality. 
2. The situation of the new sellers in period x is analogous. They sell 
s~ units in period x, s~+l in period x + 1, through s~+n- 1 in period 
x + n - 1. That is, the actions of the new sellers born in period x are 
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given by the vector 
To maximize profit, their transactions must satisfy the inequality 
This will again hold with equality under profit maximization and per-
fect foresight. 
We now come to the concept of a competitive equilibrium for the OLG 
model. 
Definition 3.2.1 A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium (or sim-
ply an equilibrium) consists of two sequences, (PI,P2, ... ) and 
which satisfy the following conditions. 
1. The sequence (p1 , p2 , ... ) is called the price path and each price Pt 
represents the prevailing price at period t. 
2. The sequence ( [ bi ] , ... , [ b~-n+l . . . bf ] , .. ·) is the (trade) al-
s l st-n+l . . . 8 t 1 t t 
location sequence. The matrix at each period represents all the trans-
actions that take place in that period. 
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3. The traded units must satisfy: 
(a) the market clearance equations, 
j j 
L b~ = L s~ for j 2: n, 
i=j-n+l i=j-n+l 
{b) the perfect foresight profit maximizing budget constraints, 
b~ + ... + b~+n-1 
s~ + ... + s~+n-l 
for each x = 1, 2, .... 
Dx (min{px , ... , Px+n-1}) and 
Sx(max{px , ··· ,Px+n-1 }) 
We shall only be concerned with environments where equilibrium prices 
support non-trivial trades. The following definition of degenerate prices 
will formalize this concept. 
Definition 3.2.2 The price path (p1 , p2 , ... ) will be called degener-
ate if for some period t, either Dt (min {Pt , ... , Pt+n-I}) 
St(max{pt, ... , Pt+n-d) = 0. 
0 or 
This could easily be avoided by assuming that both supply and demand 
functions are strictly positive. 
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3.3 Preview of Results 
This section briefly describes some of the intuition behind the results of the 
next two sections. A graphical presentation of the results of Section 3.5 will 
exemplify what is to be shown in that section. Furthermore, the intuition 
behind these graphs will also carry through to the more abstract results of 
the next section. So, consider an OLG environment with a finite time horizon 
and one parameter shift. This shift takes the following form: all generations 
born before period k are endowed with (D(·), S(·)); and all generations born 
from periods k through k + m are endowed with ( D* ( ·) , S* ( ·)). Let p0 and p~ 
be the intragenerational equilibrium prices, i.e. , D(p0 ) = S(p0 ) and D*(p~) = 
S*(p~). These are standard Arrow- Debreu equilibrium prices. Figures 3.2 
through 3.5 show four possible shifts which would often lead to price paths 
similar to those presented adjacent to the supply and demand graphs.3 Notice 
that there are at most two price changes corresponding to any of these shifts, 
and that these shifts occur at specific times. The time horizon can essentially 
be split into three relevant eras: one in which only agents with the initial 
characteristics, (D(·), S(·)), are alive; one in which some agents have the 
initial characteristics and some have (D*(·), S*(-)); and one in which only 
the latter characteristics are present. These stages shall be called the initial, 
transitional, and final eras, respectively. 
It will be shown that the four price paths shown in Figures 3.2 through 
3.5 are the only possible equilibrium price paths when p0 < p~. Fixing the 
3The uncertainty in this statement arises from the fact that the price path depends not 
only on the generational supply and demand, but also on the number of periods before 
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number of periods before and after the shift and the length of agents' life-
times, two properties of the supply and demand schedules help to determine 
which of these price paths is the equilibrium price path. If p0 is sufficiently 
less than p0, then the price path will depend on where S(p) intersects D*(p). 
The determination of whether or not these prices are significantly different 
will depend on the time scales involved. Say this intersection occurs at p. 
The intuition behind this price being of interest is that some sellers who were 
born with S(p) will still be alive when new demanders are born with D*(p). 
These agents will interact if there are gains to be made from this interaction. 
So, for instance, take p0 < p < p0 as in Figure 3.2. If the old sellers with S(p) 
sell to the new buyers with D*(p) , both agents are better off than if they had 
interacted with agents from their own generation. If p < p0 , as in Figure 3.3, 
the new buyers would want to buy at this low price, but the old sellers have 
no reason to sell below the price they could have gotten from the buyers in 
their own generation. The new buyers are willing to pay more than the old 
intragenerational equilibrium price. It will be shown that market equilibra-
tion requires that the prevailing price of the good remain fixed at one level 
during the initial and transitional eras. Figure 3.4 shows a similar case in 
which one price will prevail over both the transitional and final eras. If Po is 
"close" to p0, then one price will prevail for all periods as in Figure 3.5. This 
very casual discussion intentionally ignored some important details in order 
to present the intuition behind the results that follow. 
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3.4 The Structure of Equilibrium Price 
Paths 
This section presents a series of theorems and lemmas that characterize some 
properties of an arbitrary competitive equilibrium price path. These results 
consider an environment with up to a countably infinite time horizon (none 
of the results depend on having a fixed final period) with arbitrarily many 
parameter shifts. The results establish that the competitive equilibrium price 
path is "well behaved" in a manner to be made more precise throughout our 
discussion here. 
Our first result shows that no agent will ever live to see a reversal of a 
price change. 
Theorem 3.4.1 ((Local Weak Monotonicity)) For any non-degenerate 
equilibrium price path, (p1 , p 2 , . . . ) , in an OLG environment, we have: 
1. Ifpt < Pt+l , then 
Pt-n+l ~ Pt - n+2 ~ · · · ~ Pt < Pt+l ~ Pt+Z ~ · · · ~ Pt+n· 
2. Similarly, if Pt > Pt+l, then 
Pt-n+l 2: Pt- n+2 2: · · · 2: Pt > Pt+l 2: Pt+Z 2: · · · 2: Pt+n·4 
4 If t and n are such that these inequalities characterize prices prior to the first period, 
the inequalities involving periods prior to period one can be truncated, and the meaningful 
inequalities remain intact. 
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Proof: We will establish only the first claim because the second follows from 
symmetry. 
We are given Pt < Pt+l· Assume by way of contradiction that Pt+l > Pt+2, 
so that we have Pt < Pt+l and Pt+l > Pt+2 · All buyers who are alive in period 
t + 1 are also alive in either period t or period t + 2 when prices are lower, so 
no purchases will be made in period t + 1. Market clearance in period t + 1 
requires 
t+l t+l 
"" bi "" • 0 L....t t+l = L....t st+l = · 
i = t - n+2 i=t- n+2 
This leads to two useful observations. 
1. s~:;~+2 = 0 implies Pj ~ Pt+l for some t - n + 2 ::; j ::; t - 1. 
2. s~ti = 0 implies Pj ~ Pt+l for some t + 3 ::; j ::; t + n. 
We will focus on the second observation to build the set of inequalities work-
ing forward in time from period t + 1. A similar argument based on the first 
observation results in the chain of inequalities working backward from period 
t. 
Using the latter observation, we have Pt < Pt+l, Pt+l > Pt+2 , and Pj ~ 
Pt+l· Consider the sellers in period t + 2. Each one of them will also be alive 
in either period t + 1 or period j, when prices will be higher than in period 
t + 2. So, no seller will sell at Pt+2 . Market clearance in period t + 2 yields 
t+2 t+2 
2: b~+2 2: s~+2 0. 
i = t-n+3 i = t- n+3 
As above, b~!~ 0 implies that there exists t + 3 < u < t + n such that 
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Pu ::; Pt+2. Since Pu ::; Pt+2 < Pt+l ::; Pi, we see that u =/= j. So, we consider 
two cases: j > u and j < u. 
1. If j > u then no seller wishes to sell in u because they are able to 
sell at a higher price in either t + 1 or j, so I:;f=u- n+l s~ = 0. Buy-
ers born in period t + 1 will never make a transaction at a price 
higher than Pu because they are profit maximizers, but no seller who 
is active during these buyers' lives will ever sell at Pu or lower. So, 
Dt+l (min {Pt+l, ... , Pt+n}) = 2:::;-;,7+1 b;+l = 0, which shows that this is 
only consistent with a degenerate price path. 
2. If j < u then all buyers alive in j would prefer to buy in t + 2 or 
u than in j, so L:i=j-n+l b~ = 0. Thus St+l (max{Pt+l, ... , Pt+n}) 
2:::;-;,7+1 s;+l = 0. This is a degenerate price path again. 
So, we have established the following: Pt < Pt+l implies Pt+l ::; Pt+2· 
Now consider Pt+2 > Pt+3· Thus, we have Pt < Pt+l ::; Pt+2 and Pt+2 > 
Pt+3. Again, no buyer will buy in t + 1, as they prefer Pt and Pt+3 · The same 
is true for period t + 2. So, we have s~!i = s~!~ = 0 which implies that there 
is some j E { t + 4, ... , t + n} satisfying Pi :2: Pt+l· But then no sellers will 
want to sell in t + 3, so there is a period u as above. Now apply the previous 
argument regarding j and u to get a contradiction. Thus, if Pt < Pt+l then 
Pt+l :s; Pt+2 :s; Pt+3· 
Repeating this procedure up to period t + n yields the stated result. If 
we would try to go past t + n, it would no longer be the case that all buyers 
in period t + 1 could get a better price than Pt+l because those born in t + 1 
would die before t + n + 1. I 
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The previous result showed a weak monotonicity property of the price 
path. Another interpretation of this is t hat if the environment were to pro-
duce cyclical prices, this theorem provides a lower bound to the periodicity. 
The next few results address conditions that lead to local price stability. 
Before presenting these results, we present one more definition. 
Definition 3.4.2 The generations born in periods t through t+x will be said 
to be homogeneous if Dt(·) = · · · = Dt+x(·) and St(-) = · · · = St+x( ·). 
Theorem 3.4.3 If the generations born in periods 1, ... , t- 1 are homoge-
neous, then p 1 = · · · = Pt- l for any non-degenerate equilibrium price path 
Proof: Suppose PHI > pj for some 1 ::; j ::; t- 2. Then, with t he appropriate 
truncations, Theorem 3.4.1 yields 
Pj-n-1 ::; · · · ::; Pj < PJ+l ::; P)+2 ::; · · · ::; P]+n· 
Cl . . d . 1 . ld bj-n+2 bj+l j-n+2 + + j+l earance m peno J + y1e s j+l + · · · + J+l = sj+l · · · sJ+l' or 
0 0 z.i+l S( ) j-n+3 j+l C tl + · · · + + u-j+l = P)+l + sj+l + · · · + sJ+I· onsequen y, 
(3.1) 
M k l · · d · · ld bj-n+l + '-1 j - n+l + + sj or ar et c earance m peno J y1e s j + · · · u-j = s j · · · j , 
btn+l + .. . + ~-l + D(pj) = S(pj) + 0 + · · · + 0. Hence, 
(3.2) 
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From (3.1) and (3.2), we see that p1 2': p0 2': p1+1, which contradicts P]+l > pj, 
and the proof is completed. I 
The preceding theorem demonstrates that the price must stay fixed in 
all periods before a parameter shift. The next theorem will show that af-
ter a shift, prices will immediately adjust and then stay constant for either 
n - 1 periods or until another shift occurs, whichever comes first. These 
prices come from interaction between agents who come from heterogeneous 
generations. These time intervals where there is such interaction will be 
called transitional eras because the market is in transition from one set of 
characteristics to another. 
Theorem 3.4.4 Let (p1 , p2 , .. . ) be a non-degenerate equilibrium price path. 
For some x :::; n- 2, assume the new generations in periods t- n + 1, ... , t-
n + 1 + x are homogeneous as are the new generations in periods t, . .. , t + x. 
If Pt-1 ::=; Pt and Pt+x ::=; Pt+x+l 1 then 
Pt-1 :::; Pt = · · · = Pt+x :::; Pt+x+l· 
Similarly, Pt-1 2': Pt and Pt+x 2': Pt+x+l imply 
Pt-1 2': Pt+l = · · · = Pt+x 2': Pt+x+I· 5 
Proof: Only the first claim will be verified as the second follows from an 
5 Also note that Theorem 3.4.1 ensures that the cases where the inequalities are in 
opposite directions need not be addressed because at least one of them would have to hold 
in equality and consequently fall into one of the cases already addressed here. 
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identical argument. Assume by way of contradiction that there is a J E 
{t + 1, . . . , t + x} satisfying Pi- l <Pi· Theorem 3.4.1 implies 
Pi- n ::; · · · ::; Pi- l <Pi ::; · · · ::; Pi+n- l· 
Notice that the only buyers who would possibly be active in period j are the 
buyers of generation j. Also notice that the sellers who will die in period j 
will certainly wait until that period to sell. Also, the only sellers who would 
potentially be active in period j-1 are those who are dying in that period. Any 
buyer alive in period j-1 will make their purchases in this period or a prior 
period. Market clearance in j - 1 requires !ij=~ + · · · + !ij = ~ = s~=~ + · · · + s~=L 
or 
Similarly, for period j, fij - n+ 1 + · · · + b~ = stn+ 1 + · · · + s~ . Therefore, 
These two market clearing conditions and the homogeneity assumptions im-
ply that Pi- l ~ Pi which contradicts the assumption that Pi- l < Pi. I 
The next two lemmas will set the groundwork for a price stability theorem 
for the time interval following a transitional era, assuming it is not another 
transitional era, in which case the previous theorem holds true. 
Lemma 3.4.5 Let (p1 , p2 , .. . ) be a sequence of non-degenerate equilibrium 
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prices in some OLG model such that Pt =I= Pt+1 for some t. 
1. If the new generations in periods t-n+2 , .. . , t+2 are homogeneous, then 
Pt+1 = Pt+2· 
2. If the new generations in periods t-n + 1, ... , t + 1 are homogeneous, then 
Pt- 1 = Pt· 
Proof: (1) We prove only (1) and leave the ident ical argument of (2) for the 
reader. To this end, let 
D = Dt-n+2 = · · · = D t+2 and S = St-n+2 = · · · = St+2· 
Assume Pt < Pt+1· Then Theorem 3.4.1 implies 
Pt-n+1 ::::; · · · ::::; Pt < Pt+l ::::; · · · ::::; Pt+n · 
Suppose by way of contradiction that Pt+2 > Pt+l· Reapplying Theorem 3.4.1 
gives 
Pt-n+l ::::; · · · ::::; Pt < Pt+ 1 < Pt+2 ::::; · · · ::::; Pt+n+l· 
So, the only buyers who will be active in period t+1 are the new buyers 
in that period, and the only sellers who would be active are those who are 
dying. Thus, market clearance in t+1 yields D t+l(Pt+l) = St- n+2(Pt+1), or 
(3.3) 
Since Pt-n+l < · · · ::::; Pt+l < Pt+2 > it must be the case that I.:t~:Ln+3 b~+2 = 
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bt+2 d "t+2 i S ( ) "t+2 i I d f th t+2 an Di=t-n+3 st+2 = t-n+3 Pt+2 + Di=t-n+4 st+2 . nor er or e mar-
ket to clear in t + 2, 
t+2 
St- n+3(Pt+2) + L S~+2 ~ S(Pt+2)· (3.4) 
i=t-n+4 
Now a glance at (3.3) and (3.4) yields Pt+l = p0 ~ Pt+2, contrary to our 
assumption Pt+l < Pt+2· So, it must be the case that Pt+l = Pt+2· I 
The previous lemma showed how changes in prices could imply that prices 
in surrounding periods would be stable. The next lemma gives conditions 
under which no price change from one period to the next will imply that 
prices stay fixed for at least one additional period. 
Lemma 3.4.6 Let (p1 ,p2 , ... ) be a sequence of non-degenerate equilibrium 
prices in some OLG model. Assume that the new generations in t - n + 
2, ... , t + 2 are homogeneous. If Pt = Pt+l• then Pt+l = Pt+2. 
Proof: Let D = Dt-n+2 = · · · = Dt+2 and S = St-n+2 = · · · = St+2. Also 
assume by way of contradiction, Pt=Pt+l < Pt+2· Theorem 3.4.1 implies 
Pt-n+2 :S · · · :S Pt = Pt+l < Pt+2 :S Pt+3 :S · · · :S Pt+n+l· 
Market clearance at t + 1 yields 
t+2 t+2 t+2 
D(Pt+2) = b~t~ = L b~+2 = L s~+2 = S(Pt+2) + L 8~+2· 
i=t-n+3 i=t-n+3 i=t- n+4 
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Therefore, D(Pt+2) ;?: S(Pt+2), and so 
Pt+2 :::; Po · (3 .5) 
Similarly, market clearance at t + 1 implies 
t+1 t+1 
D(Pt+1)=Dt+1 (Pt+1) :::; L b~+1 = L s~+l :::; St-n+2(Pt+1)=S(Pt+1)· 
i=t-n+2 i=t-n+2 
Hence, Pt+l ;?: Po· A glance at (3 .5) shows that Pt+l ;?: Pt+2, which contradicts 
Pt+1 < Pt+2. Thus, Pt+l = Pt+2 must hold true. I 
The previous two lemmas are now employed to demonstrate price stability 
in eras with homogeneous agents which follow transitional eras. 
Theorem 3 .4. 7 If (P1, P2, ... ) is a sequence of non-degenerate equilibrium 
prices in some OLG model and the new generations in periods t, t + 1, ... , t+ 
n + 1 all have the sam e characteristics, then Pt+n-1 = Pt+n = Pt+n+l· 
Proof: If Pt+n =f. Pt+n+l, then by Lemma 3.4.5, Pt+n-1 = Pt+n· Lemma 3.4.6 
t hen implies Pt+n = Pt+n+1, a contradiction. Therefore, Pt+n = Pt+n+1· A 
similar argument shows the impossibility of Pt+n- 1 =f. Pt+n· I 
The preceding results can be summarized as follows . Theorem 3.4.3 shows 
that prices in all periods prior to the first shift must be equal. Theorem 3.4.4 
implies that after a shift , prices may make one jump and will then remain 
fixed until another shift or all of t he generations with the prior characteris-
tics die. Theorem 3.4.1 ensures that if another shift does occur during this 
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transitional era, it cannot reverse the direction of the previous price change. 
Finally, Theorem 3.4.7 addresses the case where the transitional era passes 
without another shift occurring. In this case, prices will make one adjust-
ment following the last period of the transitional era and then will remain 
fixed until another shift occurs. Clearly, the strongest result here comes from 
Theorem 3.4.1 which says that no agent will live to see a reversal of a price 
trend. 
3.5 Finite Time Horizon and a Single Shift 
Next, consider a simple OLG model in which there is a finite time horizon 
and a single parametric shift. For instance, let us say that the shift occurs in 
period k, meaning that generations born starting in period k have different 
characteristics than those of the previous generations. Also assume that 
period k + m is the final period. Agents will still live for n periods. Recall 
that none of the results in the previous section were dependent on an infinite 
number of periods. In examining the price path, we can distinguish three 
eras. 
Theorem 3.4.3 addressed the first era, consisting of the first k -1 periods, 
which will be called the initial era because all agents who are active in these 
periods have the initial characteristics (D(·), S(·)). The second era is called 
transitional because some of the active agents have the initial characteristics 
and some have (D*(·), S*(-)); this era will last for periods k through k+n-2. 
Theorem 3.4.4 shows that prices must remain constant over this era. In 
the final era, periods k + n - 1 through k + m, all agents have the latter 
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characteristics. Theorem 3.4. 7 can be applied to this final era to show that 
Pk+n- 1 = · · · = Pk+m· We will pick k and m so that there is the potential to 
have different prices in each of the three eras. This will require that k ~ n 
and m ~ n- 1. As these inequalities approach being binding, the parameter 
shifts must become increasingly severe to support three distinct price eras. 
Theorems 3.4.1 , 3.4.3, 3.4.4 and 3.4.7 show that the equilibrium price 
path can only take one of two following two forms: 
1) P1 = · · · = Pk-1 :S Pk = · · · = Pk+n-2 :S Pk+n-1 = · · · = Pk+m, or 
2) P1 = · · · = Pk- 1 ~ Pk = · · · = Pk+n-2 ~ Pk+n- 1 = · · · = Pk+m· 
We must now specify what kind of shifts we will consider. Let p 0 be the 
price at which the market would clear if agents with the initial characteristics 
could only trade with one another, i.e., D(p0 ) = S(p0 ) . Similarly, let p0 be the 
intragenerational equilibrium price for agents with the final characteristics, or 
D* (p0) = S* (p0). All shifts must satisfy one of the three following conditions: 
Po > p0, Po = p0, or Po < p0. It is not difficult to show that if Po = p0, then 
the price path will be flat at this price. We will only explicitly consider shifts 
such that p0 < p0, because the results are easily modified to apply for Po > Po 
by utilizing the symmetry. 
The next lemma shows that equilibrium prices must be weakly increasing 
when Po< Po· 
Lemma 3.5.1 For Po < p0, where D(po) = S(po) and D*(Po) = S*(Po) , 
a non-degenerate equilibrium price path, (p1 , .. . , Pk+m) , must be weakly in-
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creasing in the following manner: 
P1 = · · · = Pk-1 ~ Pk = · · · = Pk+n-2 ~ Pk+n-1 = · · · = Pk+m· 
Proof: Suppose Pk+n-2 > Pk+n-1. Then Theorem 3.4.1 asserts 
Pk-1 2: · · · 2: Pk+n-2 > Pk+n-1 2: · · · 2: Pk+2n-2· 
But we know that prices are constant within the three eras. So, 
P1 = · · · = Pk-1 2: Pk = · · · = Pk+n-2 > Pk+n-1 = · · · = Pk+m· 
Let P1 = P1=· · ·=Pk-1, P2 = Pk=· · ·=Pk+n-2, and P3 = Pk+n-1=· · ·=Pk+m and 
note that P1 2: P2 > P3· 
Aggregating the market clearing conditions for periods 1 through k+n- 2 
yields 
(k- n)D(pl) + (n- 1)D(p2) = (k- 1)S(pl) + (n- 1)S*(p2)· 
From P2 ~ p1 , we obtain 
(k- 1)D(p2) 2: (k- 1)S(p2) + (n- l )S*(p2) 2: (k- l )S(p2)· 
Hence, D(p2) 2: S(p2 ) from which it follows that 
P2 ~Po· (3.6) 
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Similarly, aggregating the market clearing conditions for periods k + n -1 
through k + m yields (m + l)D*(p3 ) = (m- n + 2)S*(p3 ). This implies that 
D*(p3) < S*(p3), which leads to p3 2: p0. This, along with (3.6) and the 
premise that Po < p0, yields P2 ::; Po <Po ::; p3, contrary to P2 > P3· 
A similar argument shows that Pk- 1 > Pk cannot happen. I 
Note that this implies that the equilibrium price path (p1 , . .. ,Pk+m) can 
be fully specified by the triplet (p1 ,Pk.Pk+m)· So far, we have examined the 
levels of equilibrium prices in each of the three eras relative to the equilibrium 
prices in other eras. We will now concentrate on locating these equilibrium 
prices relative to the characteristics of the OLG model. 
Lemma 3.5.2 Let (p1 ,p2 , ... ) be a sequence of non-degenerate equilibrium 
prices. For p0 < p0, equilibrium prices in the initial era are bounded from 
below by Po, z. e., 
P1 = · · · =Pk-1 2: Po· 
Similarly, 
Pk+n- 1 = · · · = Pk+m::; P~· 
Proof: We shall only establish the first claim as the second follows from an 
identical argument. We already know that 
P1 = · · · = Pk- 1 ::; Pk = · · · = Pk+n-2 ::; Pk+n- 1 = · · · = Pk+m· 
We now distinguish two cases: P1 < Pk and P1 = Pk· 
Consider first p1 < Pk· In this case, the aggregate market clearance in 
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the initial era (periods 1 through k- 1) yields (k- 1)D(p1 ) = (k- n)S(p1 ) . 
So D(pl) ~ S(pl), from which it follows that p1 2: p0 . 
Now consider p1 = Pk· In this case, we distinguish two subcases: 
P1 =pk=Pk+m and P1 =pk ~ Pk+m· 
If P1 = Pk = Pk+m , then aggregating the market clearance conditions 
through all periods, we get 
Rewriting this as (k- 1)[D(p1)- S(p1)] = (m + 1)[S*(p1)- D*(p1 )] shows 
that D(p1 ) - S(p1 ) and S*(pl) - D*(p1 ) have the same sign, which happens 
only when Po ~ P1 ~Po· 
Finally, let us consider the case p1 = Pk < Pk+m· Here, market clearing 
aggregated over the first k + n - 2 periods (the initial and transitional eras) 
implies 
So, (k - 1)D(p1) ~ (k - 1)S(p1) , or D(p1) ~ S(p1 ) , from which it follows 
that p1 2: p0 holds true in this case too. I 
In order to determine the nature of any given shift, we only need to 
calculate three critical prices. These prices will help us to classify all shifts 
into one of four possible types. Intuitively, think of these critical prices as 
the prices that would clear the market in each of the eras if the shift causes 
the price to increase greatly. The shift is so extreme that all sellers who can 
possibly supply in the era after they are born will postpone activity until the 
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next era, and buyers will make all of their purchases in the era of their birth. 
These three critical prices are 7!'1 , 7!'2 and 7!'3 and will by definition satisfy 
the following equations: 
(k- 1)D(7r1) 
D*(7r2) 
(m- n + 2)D*(7r3) 
(k- n)S(7r1) 
S(7r2) 
(m + 1)S*(7r3) 




Lemma 3 .5 .3 Assume that p0 < p0 and that (p1 , p 2 , ... ) is a non-degenerate 
equilibrium path of prices. Then: 
1. Prices in the initial era are bounded from above by 11'1 , i.e., 
P1 = · · · = Pk-1 :S 11'1 . 
2. Prices in the final era are bounded from below by 11'3, i.e., 
Pk+n-1 = · · · = Pk+m 2:: 11'3. 
Proof: We shall establish the first case only. The market clearing aggregated 
over the initial era (periods 1 through k -1) can have a demand at most equal 
to (k - 1)D(p1) , while supply is at least equal to (k - n)S(p1). Therefore, 
we have 
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If P1 > 1r1 holds true, then strict monotonicity implies 
contrary to (k- l)D(1r1) = (k- n)S(1r1) . So, p1 ::::; 1r1 must be true. I 
We can also use these critical prices to distinguish between types of shifts. 
For a non-degenerate equilibrium price path, (p1 ,p2 , ... ), we have the follow-
ing cases: 
1. 1r1 < 1r2 < 1r3. Here, prices satisfy 
2. 1r2 ::::; 1r1 < 1r3. In this case 
P1 = Pk> Pk+m = 1r3, and(k- l)D(pl) + (n- l)D*(pi) = (k- l)S(pl)· 
3. 1r1 < 1r3 ::::; 1r2. This leads to 
4. 1r3 ::::; 1r1. In which case 
(k- l)D(p1) + (m + l)D*(p1)=(k- l)S(pl) + (m + l)S*(pi)· 
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These four cases correspond directly to Figures 3.2-3.5. In order to show 
existence of these equilibrium paths, we must show that some set of transac-
tions that are supported by these prices will clear the market in all periods. 
Before doing so, we will make some simplifying assumptions and introduce 
some notation. The simplifying assumptions are adopted only to ease expo-
sition; they do not affect the existence of the equilibrium transactions. First, 
assume that k -1 is divisible by n-1, i.e., a(n- 1) = k -1 for some integer a. 
Also, let m+ 1 be divisible by n -1, so that ,B(n- 1) = m+ 1 for some integer 
,6. These assumptions require that the number of periods in both the initial 
and final eras are proportional to the number of periods in the transitional 
era. This greatly simplifies the expression of intergenerational transactions 
because it allows us to partition the set of all generations into groups of size 
n - 1. This is useful because we will be able to specify transactions for each 
of these groups, rather than by generation. We will need some notation to 
help us classify each generation into the corresponding group. First, for each 
generation i, we let v(i) = max{A E {0, 1, 2, ... , k+m}: (n-1)A < i}. Also 
let V = D (p1 ) , S = S(p1 ) , V* = D*(pk), S = S(pk) , V* = D*(Pk+rn), and 
S* = S*(Pk+rn)· 
Using the transactions given in Table 3.1, we will now show by a series of 
propositions that these are the unique competitive equilibrium price paths 
under each of the conditions on the 1r's. 
Proposition 3 .5 .4 The transactions given in Table 3.1 are consistent with 
profit maximization. 
Proof: Since prices have been shown to be weakly monotonically increas-
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Table 3.1: Examples of Equilibrium Transactions 
z Buyers Sellers* 
bi = '[) t s~='D-v( i) ( S-V) 
1, .. . ,k-n bi - - bi - 0 i+1 - · · · - i+n-2 - s~+1 = ... = s~+n-2 = 0 
bi+n-1 = 0 s~+n-1 = [v(i) + 1](5 -'D) 
bi = '[) 
t si = 1J- v(i)(S -'D) 
k-n+1, .. . ,k-1 bi - - bi - 0 i+1 - · · · - i+n-2 - si - - si - 0 i+1 - · · · - i+n-2 -
b~+ 1 = 0 t n- s~+n-1 = S -V + v(i)(S -'D) 
bi = i5* t s~=S* -v(k+m+1-i)(V* -S*) 
k, ... ,k+n-2 bi - - bi - 0 i+1 - · · · - i+n-2 - si - - si - 0 i+l - · · · - i+n-2 -
b~+n- 1 = 0 si =v(k+m+1-i)(V*-S*) •+n-1 
bi = '[)* t s~=S* -v( k+m+ 1-i) ('D* -S*) 
k+n-1, ... ,k+m bi - - bi - 0 i+1 - · · · - i+n-2 - si - - si - 0 .1_ ... _ + 2-t+ t n-
b~+ 1 = 0 t n- s~+n-1 =v(k+m+ 1-i)('D* -S*) 
• As above, v(i ) = max{A E {0, 1, 2, ... , k + m} : (n- l).X < i}. 
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ing, profit maximizing behavior simply requires that buyers' total purchases 
equal their demand at the prevailing price at the time of their birth. So, for 
generations 1 through k - 1, 2:::~;,7- 1 b~ = 1) satisfies the profit maximizing 
assumption. Table 3.1 clearly shows that the suggested transactions satisfy 
this condition. For generations k through k + n - 2, profit maximization 
requires 2:::~;,7- 1 b~ = f5*, which is also easily verified. Finally, for generations 
k + n- 1 through k + m, we need 2:::~;,7- 1 b~ = 1)*, which is trivial to see 
from Table 3.1. Similarly, sellers total sales must equal their supply at the 
prevailing price at the time of their death. This is also easily verified, and is 
thus omitted. I 
Proposition 3.5.5 The transactions specified m Table 3.1 are all non-
negative. 
Proof: It is clear that no buyer is ever required to buy a negative quantity, 
so we can simply concentrate on sellers. 
The initial transaction from Table 3.1 for sellers born in periods 1 through 
k - 1 is s~ = 1) - v(i)(S - 'D). Lemma 3.5.2 establishes that P1 ~ Po, 
which implies that S ~ V, thus this s~ is decreasing in v(i). Since v(i) 
is nondecreasing in i , we need only verify non-negativity for the greatest 
z, or k - 1. Since v(k - 1) = a - 1, we need only verify that sti = 
1) - (a - 1)(5- 'D) = a'D - (a - 1)5 ~ 0. Lemma 3.5.3 showed that 
p1 ~ 1r1 , which implies (k - 1)'D ~ (k - n)S. Dividing both sides of this 
inequality by n-1 produces a'D ~ (a-1)5, which establishes sZ=i ~ 0. The 
only other nontrivial periods for these sellers is their final period, i + n- 1. 
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We must distinguish between those who will die in the initial era and those 
who will die in the transitional era. For those who die in the initial era, 
s~+n-l = [v(i) + 1](S- D) 2': 0, because S 2': D. For those who die in the 
transitional era, s~+n-l = S -D+v(i)(S -D). But Pk 2': p1 by Lemma 3.5.1, 
so that S 2': S, which clearly implies non-negativity. 
For sellers born in periods k through k + m, Table 3.1 lists the initial 
transaction as s~ = S* - v(k + m + 1- i)(D*- S*). From Lemma 3.5.2 we 
know that Pk+m ::; p0, and thus D* 2': S*. So, s~ is increasing in v( k+m+ 1-i); 
it is consequently decreasing in i. We need only verify non-negativity for the 
lowest i, which is i = k. It is easy to show that v(k + m + 1- k) = /3- 1, so 
s~ = /]S*- (/3- 1)D*. From Lemma 3.5.3 we get Pk+m 2': 1r3 , which implies 
( m-n )D* ::; ( m + 1 )S*. Dividing both sides by n -1 yields (/3- 1 )D* ::; /]S*, 
which clearly shows that s~ 2': 0. Finally, note that the inequality s~+n-l = 
v(k + m + 1 - i)(D*- S*) 2': 0 follows from D* 2': S* . I 
Before addressing the issue of market clearance, it will first be shown that 
Table 3.1 does not specify any market activity after the final period. 
Proposition 3 .5.6 No transaction specified in Table 3.1 for the periods after 
period k + m are positive under any of the four proposed equilibrium price 
paths. 
Proof: This condition is clearly met for the buyers. The only sellers who are 
potentially active in period k + m + 1 and beyond are those born in period 
k + m-n + 2 through k + m. The only non-trivial transactions specified after 
the final period are these sellers' activity in their final period, where they sell 
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s~+n-l = v(k+m+l-i)(V*-S*). It is easily verified that v(k+m+l-i) = 0 
for k + m - n + 2 ~ i ~ k + m. I 
And now we come to the main theorem of this section. It shows that 
under each of the four conditions on the 1r's, the corresponding prices are the 
only prices that will clear the markets. 
Theorem 3.5. 7 For each of the following relations between 1r1 , 1r2 and 1r3 , 
the specified price path (p1 , p2 , ... ) is the unique competitive equilibrium price 
path. 
(k- l)D(p1) + (n- l)D*(pl) = (k- l)S(pl)· 
(m + l)D*(pk) = (n- l)S(pk) + (m + l)S*(pk)· 
(k- l)D(p1) + (m + l)D*(pl) = (k- l)S(pl) + (m + l)S*(pl)· 
Proof: Showing that the transactions in Table 3.1 clear the market in the 
initial and final era will not depend on the specific characteristics of each of 
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these price paths, so this will be established first. Then each of the four price 
paths will be considered in turn. It will be shown that the market clears in 
the transitional era along these price paths for the corresponding types of 
shifts and that all other prices fail to do so. 
We will start with the initial era, periods 1 through k - 1. Take some 
arbitrary period, i where 1 :=:; i :=:; k - 1. Market clearance in period i then 
requires bi-n+l + · · · + bi = si- n+l + · · · + si or 
t t t t' 
0 + · · · + 0 + 1J = [v(i- n + 1) + 1](5 -'D)+ 0 + · · · + 0 + 1J- v(i)(S -D), 
which is equivalent to 1J = 1J because v( i - n + 1) + 1 = v( i). 
Next, consider the final era, periods k + n - 1 through k + m. Market 
clearance in some arbitrary period i in this era requires b~-n+l + · · · + b~ = 
s~-n+1 + · · · +s!, or 1)* = v(k+m-i +n)('D*- S*) + 0 + · · · +O+S* -v(k + 
m + 1- i)'D* - S*, which, given that v(k + m- i + n) = v(k + m + 1- i) + 1, 
is equivalent to 1)* = 1)* - S* + S*. As in the initial era, market clearance 
in the final era follows trivially from the proposed equilibrium transactions. 
Market clearance in the transitional era will depend on specific qualities 
of the price paths. We will first establish a general statement of market 
clearance in this era and then show that it is met under each price path. 
Again, take some arbitrary i E { k , . .. , k + n- 2}. Notice that v(i- n + 1) = 
a- 1 and v(k + m + 1- i) = (3- 1 for each i by the definitions of v, a, and 
(3. Market clearance in period i yields b~-n+1 + · · · + b~ = s~-n+1 + · · · + s~ is 
equivalent to 1J* = S-1J+v(i - n+1)(S -1J)+S*-v(k+m+1-i)('D* - S*). 
Rewriting, we have 'D* = S -'D +(a- 1)(5 -'D)+ S*- ((3- 1)(1J* - S*), 
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or 
1)* = S- aV +(a- 1)5 + (JS*- ((3- 1)7J*. (3.10) 
We now consider each of the four price paths in turn. 
First consider price path 1, where p1 = 1r1 , Pk = 1r2 , and Pk+rn = 1T3. 
Under p1 = 1r1 , aV = (a-1)5. Similarly, Pk+rn = 1T3 implies ((J-1)7J* = (JS*. 
So (3.10) becomes 7)* = S, which is true by the definition of 1r2 . 
In order for another set of prices to also clear the market, it must be the 
case that these prices change the intergenerational nature of the transactions. 
For instance, if Pk were to decrease, but not enough to make the sellers of 
generation k - 1 indifferent between selling in period k - 1 and period k , 
i.e. , P1 < Pk, then the market could not possibly clear in the transitional era, 
as demand would increase and supply would decrease. This argument shows 
that price changes must be accompanied by a corresponding change in the 
generational distribution of transactions across eras. In order for this to be 
the case, it must be that the relation between the prices in these eras also 
changes. As long as p1 < Pk < Pk+rn , the generational distribution of prices 
will not change, and the proposed price path is the only price path that can 
clear the market. Consider a new set of prices where p~ = p~ < p~+rn· The 
market will certainly not clear for p~ :::; p1 or p~ 2: Pk· By Lemma 3.5.3, the 
price in the initial era cannot increase because along the current price path, 
p1 = 1r1 , which is the upper bound for prices in the initial era. Thus, the only 
way for prices to change would be for p~ to decrease to p1 . This will cause 
increased supply and decreased demand in the transition era and no change 
in the initial era. Markets could not clear under these conditions. The same 
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holds true for an increase in Pk. 
Next, consider price path 2, where p1 = Pk, (k - 1)1J + (n- 1)1J* 
(k - 1)S, and Pk+m = 1r3 . The second statement is an aggregation of the 
market clearing conditions for the first k + n- 2 periods. The terms involving 
S* and 1J* will again cancel each other in the supply side of (3.10) due to 
({3 - 1 )V* = f3S*. Dividing the aggregate market clearing condition by n - 1 
results in a'V + f5* = aS. Setting p1 = Pk , we get S = S , or cx'V + V* = 
S +(ex- 1)S , which is identical to (3.10). 
The only plausible alternative price path is a (p~,p~, p~+m), where p~ ::::; p1 , 
P~ ~ Pk, p~ < p~ and p~+m = Pk+m· Any other price path would either triv-
ially violate market clearance, the known bounds to prices or weak mono-
tonicity. But p~ < p~ implies that the generational distribution of trans-
actions must be as they were under price path 1 in order for markets to 
clear, and thus p~ = 1r1 , p~ = 1r2 and p~+m = 1r3 . But we are considering an 
environment in which 1r1 ~ 1r2 , sop~ < p~ is a contradiction. 
Under price path 3, p1 =1r1 , Pk=Pk+m, and (m+1)1J*=(n- 1)S+(m+1)S *. 
The terms involving Sand 1J will again cancel each other in the supply side of 
(3.10) due to cx'V = (a-1)S just as they did under price path 1. Dividing the 
aggregate market clearing condition by n - 1 results in f31J* = S + f3S*. From 
Pk = Pk+m we see that 1J* = V* , and so (3 .10) yields 'V* = S+f3S* -(f3-1)V* 
which is equivalent to the restatement of the condition that Pk = Pk+m given 
in the previous sentence. 
Similar to the previous price path, the only plausible alternative price 
path is (p~,p~,p~+m) where p~ = P1, P~ ::::; Pk, P~+m ~ Pk+m and P~ < P~+m· 
The argument showing that market clearance under this condition will violate 
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the condition that 1r2 ~ 1r3 is identical to the argument of the previous section. 
Under the final price path, p1 = Pk = Pk+m· Aggregating all k+m market 
clearing conditions requires that ( k -1 )V + ( m + 1 )V* = ( k -1 )S + ( m + 1 )S*. 
Dividing this by n - 1 results in o:TJ + {JV* = o:S + {JS*. Constant prices 
imply that i5* = 1)* and S = S , so (3.10) can be rewritten as 1)* = o:(S-
V) + {J(S* - V*) + 1)* which is clearly equivalent to the restatement of the 
aggregate market clearing condition. 
Any alternative set of prices must include either a decrease in initial prices 
or an increase in final prices. Either of these cases would result in a price 
path satisfying p~ ~ p~ ~ p~+m and one of the following inequalities: either 
p~ < p~ or p~ < p~+m· Consider p~ < p~; this will lead to the same market 
clearing condition for the initial era as held under price path 1. So market 
clearance requires p~ = 1r1 . Notice that at this price level, initial prices are 
at their upper bound, so it must be the case that the inequality was created 
by an increase in Pk· Note that this also implies that p~+m > Pk+m because 
Pk = Pk+m and prices are weakly increasing. This price change has two 
effects: it at least weakly increases the proportion of sellers to buyers in the 
transitional and final eras because p~ < p~ , and it increases prices in these 
eras. These two effects are inconsistent with market clearance. I 
While this section concentrated on a single shift in the parameters of the 
economy, it is clear that this is just a special case of a class of environments 
in which any finite number of shifts could occur. Think of adding another t 
periods onto the k + m periods already considered. The generations born in 
periods k + m + 1 through k + m + t are born with characteristics denoted 
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( D' ( ·), S' ( ·)). If m < n then this next shift occurs before a steady state is 
reached after the first shift. If agents born before period k are still alive 
in period k + m + 1, there will be a transitional era that lasts until either 
agents born in k - 1 die or another shift occurs. In the former case, another 
transitional era would start in period k + n - 1 and would last until the 
agents born in period k + m die. Assuming no more shifts have occurred to 
that point, a stable period would begin in which only agents characterized 
by (D' (-), S'(·)) are active. Naturally, the price changes in these eras would 
be constrained by the weak monotonicity implied by Theorem 3.4.1. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper presented some local monotonicity and stability results for a wide 
class of overlapping generations environments in which market parameters 
may vary greatly. A special case with a finite time horizon and a single 
parameter shift was shown to produce a unique perfect foresight competitive 
equilibrium. All of these results were developed for agents with arbitrarily 
long finite lifetimes. 
One of the main goals of this paper was to develop a set of unique per-
fect foresight competitive equilibria for a class of finite horizon overlapping 
generations models that would be broad enough to allow alternate models 
to make diverse predictions. A simple example will show that these results 
would help to differentiate between two plausible models. The first is the per-
fect foresight model developed here. The second model assumes that people 
do not have perfect foresight and that they trade as if they were only trading 
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with agents of their generation. So the equilibrium price path will simply be 
the intragenerational prices. When n is small relative to k and m, the stable 
prices before and after the shift are relatively close to the intragenerational 
prices and the transitional period is short. This makes it hard to economet-
rically distinguish between the two models. However, as n increases, these 
price paths start to diverge, and econometric tests become more plausible. 
Natural extensions of this work include the types of experimental investi-
gations of the perfect foresight assumption and various expectation formation 
models. On a theoretical level, many possibilities exist. The relaxation of 
perfect foresight could take many forms. Also, we could consider models 
of imperfect competition, such as monopoly and duopoly in these environ-
ments. These may be of particular interest because experimental evidence 
in oligopoly situations tends to show very interesting price dynamics. Per-
haps some insight into these dynamics could be gained by examining these 
situations in an overlapping generations context. Additionally, we could con-
sider a model where the lengths of agents' lives are stochastic rather than 
deterministic, as was assumed here. 
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Appendix A 
Derivation of the Error Prone 
Agents Equilibrium 
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This appendix will present a partial calculation of the sequential equilibrium 
in the error prone agents model. Most of the strategies were found by using a 
set of Mathematica1 programs. The equilibrium for the final three periods is 
presented here. Given the length of this appendix, it should be clear why all 
eight periods were not included. This appendix is intended to show how one 
constructs such equilibria. It does not pretend to be a complete development 
of the equilibrium. 
As in the body of the paper, the payoff vectors used by CW in their 
Pr(Y) = .33 experiments will be considered. As stated in Section 1.3, the 
payoffs to an X-type for repaying, reneging and not getting a loan are 60, 150 
and 10 respectively. The payoffs to bankers in the same order are 40, -100 and 
10. The bankers' update their beliefs about the type of entrepreneur they are 
facing according to (1.1) and (1.2). The indifference condition of a banker 
in period t is given in (1.4). Y-types still have a dominant strategy to repay. 
Development of the equilibrium proceeds through backward induction. 
A.l Period 8 
It is clear that in the last period, X-types will not worry about reputation 
effects of their actions. They strictly prefer to renege in the absence of 
reputation effects, so Sa = 0. Given that knowledge, the bankers' decision 
criterion can be simplified to a simple condition on P1 . Given that Sa = 0, 
(1.4) leads to the following rule. 
1 Copyright @1988-91 Wolfram Research, Inc. 
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For Ps > 11Ll4-E[2 Bs wants to lend. 1-E 
For Ps 11{14-E[2 Bs is indifferent. 1-E 
For P8 < 11Li~~EL2 B8 does not want to lend. 
Notice that for certain values of E, no viable P8 will give B8 the inclination 
to lend. Consider the condition that will make this indifference threshold 
greater than one. 
11/14- E/2 
1- € > 
1 
11/14- E/2 > 1-E 
€ > 3/7 (A.1) 
This is mentioned now because this limit on E will reappear and it is useful to 
know from where it came. The intuition behind it is that as E increases, Ps 
plays a diminishing role in B8 's expected payoff from granting a loan. Given 
the disutility B8 receives from a default , as the probability of observing a 
default approaches one-half with a high E, B8 strictly prefers to refuse to 
lend. 
A.2 Period 7 
For X-types to have mixed strategies in period seven, it must be the case 
that B8 is indifferent in order to balance the expected payoffs from either 
of the two actions available to X 7 (this is shorthand for an X-type taking 
action in period seven). Since B8 's indifference corresponds to a unique value 
for P8 , strategies based on each of the three updating rules can induce this 
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indifference. 
Start by considering the case where P{8 satisfies B 8 's indifference condi-
tion. Setting P{8 from (1.1) equal to the level of P8 at which B8 is indifferent, 
and solving for S 7 will result in a mixed strategy that will lead B 8 to be in-
different following a repayment in period seven. This strategy will be called 
sf( B . Performing the suggested algebra results in: 
SPB _ 
1 
_ (1- E/2)[11/14- E/2- (1- c)P7] 
7 
- (1- P7 )(11/14- E/2)(1 - E) · 
(A.2) 
Two more conditions must be met to fully specify this equilibrium path. 
First, the set of values of P7 for which 0 ::; S!(8 ::; 1 must be specified. This 
can easily be shown to be the case for P7 satisfying 
(c/2)(11/14- c/2) 11/14- E/2 
~~~~~~~~ ::; p7 ::; ~----~-
(1- c)(3/14) 1 - E 
(A.3) 
The upper bound to this range is, by no coincidence, the belief at which 
B 8 would be indifferent. The intuition for this will be covered later. The 
second condition to check is that there exists a strategy for B 8 that will make 
X 7 indifferent between repaying and reneging. As shown in Theorem 1.3.2, 
the possibility of an error in period seven by the entrepreneur need not be 
considered. Let L:8 be the mixed strategy B 8 will play if he is indifferent 
following a repayment. Before this can be calculated, it is necessary to find 
what the reaction of B 8 would be following a renege by X 7 . 
For all valid S!(8 except when S!(8 = 1, Theorem 1.3.1 implies that Bs 
will not intend to lend following a renege because P{8 makes B8 indifferent 
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and P8RN < P{B. The case where S!(B = 1 will play an important role later, 
so it is not considered here. The expected payoff to reneging under s!(B is 
150 + (1 - c/2)10 + (c/2)[(1- c/2)150 + (c/2)60]. The expected payoff to 
repaying is 60 + [(1- c)L:s + c/2][(1- c/2)150 + ( c/2)60] + [(1- c)(1- L:s) + 
c/2]10. L:s must equate these two expected payoffs. 
LPB- 18 
8 - 28-37c+9c2 
(A.4) 
Note that for c 2: .291, B8 would have to lend with a probability greater 
than one under L: B. This is due to the fact that for such a high error rate, 
any gains that X 7 may get from repaying are outweighed by the expected 
loss from an error occurring in the next round. For c 2: .291, the expected 
payoff to reneging is increased due to the greater possibility of accidentally 
receiving a loan to the extent that it dominates repaying. Clearly, for this 
range of beliefs, S7 = 0. So B 7 will have the same indifference condition B 8 
had. But then X 6 will be facing a situation identical to X 7 's, so X 6 will also 
always intend to renege. This propagates all the way to the beginning of 
the game. So for c 2: .291, X-types should always renege, and bankers will 
always base their lending decision on the criterion given for B 8 . The rest of 
the appendix considers c < .291. 
Next consider the case where B 8 is indifferent following a renege. This 
requires that P8RN satisfies B8 's indifference condition. X 7 's strategy that 
meets this condition will be denoted by s!(N. Setting P8RN from (1.2) equal 
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to B 8 's indifference threshold and solving for 57 produces 
SRN (t/2)[11/14- t/2- (1- t)P7] 
7 = 1 + -'--(-'---1 _:__-'--p---'7 '----:) (-11-/,...--14-'----€ /_:_2-:-) (.,.---1--'----€--,-.!.) . (A.5) 
This is a valid probability for P7 satisfying 
(11/14- t/2)(1- t/2) p 11/14- t/2 -'-----'-----:---:.,---..:_:_,.. _ _:__:_ > 7 > -'---------'--
(1- ~:)11/14 - - 1- € 
(A.6) 
Notice that the lower bound here is the upper bound on p7 for 5{'8 to be 
valid. At this critical level of beliefs, 5{'8 = s!(N = 1. 
To find the strategy by B8 that will support S!j-N, it must first be 
determined what X 7 's expected payoff is if she repays the loan. The-
orem 1.3.1 shows that if a renege makes B 8 indifferent, then a repay-
ment should imply that B8 intends to lend. The payoff to repayment is 
60+(1-~:/2)[(1-~:/2)150+(~:/2)60]+(~:/2)10. In response to a renege, B 8 will 
intend to lend with probability L:N. The expected payoff to X 7 from reneg-
ing is 150+[(1-~:)L:N +t/2][(1-~:/2)150+( ~:/2)60]+ [(1-~:)(1-L:N)+~:/2]10. 
Setting these expected payoffs equal and solving for L:N results in: 
LRN - 10- 37~: + 9~:2 
8 - 28 - 37€ + 9~:2 (A.7) 
For t 2 .291 , B 8 would have to lend with negative probability in response 
to a renege to equate the two expected payoffs. This is the same value of t 
at which Lf8 became greater than one. The common factor is that in both 
cases, an increasing ~: implies that X 7 would prefer to take the relatively 
certain payoff from the renege in period seven over repaying and hoping an 
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error is not made in the future. 
From (1.2), it is clear that PlN is increasing in P7 . Consider the upper 
bound of the support of 8!fN . At that point, 87 = 0, and a renege leads Bs to 
be indifferent. Since P8RN is increasing in P7 , it must be the case that for P1 
greater than that upper bound, B8 would intend to lend following a renege. 
That implies that the equilibrium for these very high beliefs is 87 = 0. 
Similarly, from the first expression of Pi-t.f in (1.1), P{8 is clearly increas-
ing in P7 and decreasing in 87 . So consider the lower bound of P1 for which 
8!(8 is valid. At that point, 5!(8 = 0 and Bs is only indifferent following a 
repayment . For 87 = 0, P7 lower than this lower bound will imply that Bs 
will not even want to lend following a repayment. Since P{8 is decreasing in 
87 , there is no strategy that would make B 8 inclined to make a loan following 
a repayment. Theorem 1.3.1 implies that no loan will be intended following 
a renege either, so for these low beliefs, 87 = 0. Table A.1 summarizes the 
possible equilibrium strategies for period seven. 
Table A.l: X 7 and B8 's Equilibrium Strategies 














(n L 14-eL2)(1-•L2) 
(1-e)ll/14 
1 
81 a renege a repayment 
81 = o L8 = 0 Ls = 0 
8!(8 Ls = 0 LPB 8 
8 RN 7 £RN 8 Ls = 1 
81 = o Ls = 1 Ls = 1 
Now turn to the lending decision of B 7 . This decision will naturally 
depend on the equilibrium strategy of X 7 , so the lending decision needs to 
be considered under each of the three strategies: 87 = 0, 8!(8 and 8!fN. For 
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57 = 0, B 7 's lending criterion will be the same as B8 's, except that B7 will 
be concerned with P7 instead of P8 . This is the case because bankers are 
one-shot players, so as long as the X-types equilibrium strategy is to always 
renege, the lending criterion will always be the same as B8 's. Table A.1 shows 
that the indifference level of g is the point where equilibrium switches from 
5{'8 to 5!,?-N. This necessarily implies that this level of p7 is above the upper 
bound of the first range where 57 = 0 is the equilibrium and is below the 
lower bound of the second range where 57 = 0. So when 57 = 0 because of 
low P7 , B 7 should not intend to lend. For the high levels of P7 for which the 
equilibrium also is 57 = 0, B 7 should intend to lend. 
For the path that includes 5{'8 , finding B 7 's strategy is somewhat more 
difficult. The general form for banker indifference given in (1.4) with 57 = 
5{'8 is 
(1 - 5.f8 )(1 - ?7 )(1- E) = 3/14- E/2, 
which can be shown to reduce to 
(11/ 14)(11/14 - E/2) = p
7 (1 - E/2)(1 -E) . 
(A.8) 
Some simple algebra shows that for E < 3/7, the indifference threshold given 
by (A.8) is in the interior of the support of 5{'8 . This means that for certain 
values of P7 for which 5{'8 is an equilibrium strategy for an X-type, B7 
will not intend to lend, for certain values B 7 will intend to lend and for a 
particular P7 given on the left side of (A.8), B 7 will be indifferent. If the left 
side is less (greater) than the right side, then B 7 intends to (not) lend. 
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To calculate B 7's strategy along the path where S!,m is X 7 's equilibrium 
strategy, one must evaluate (1.4) using s!,m. As above, 
(1- SfN)(1- p7 )(1- c) = 3/14- c/2 
can be shown to reduce to 
p
7 
= (3/14)(11/14- c/2) 
(c/2)(1- c) · 
(A.9) 
If the left side is less (greater) than the right side, then B 7 intends to (not) 
lend. Note that for S!(N there is an upper bound on P1 for which B1 will 
be willing to lend. This is because S!(N is decreasing in P7 . Once again, the 
constraint c < 3/7 shows up. This time, for c < 3/7, the right side of (A.9) 
is greater than the largest value of P7 for which 0 ::::; SfN ::::; 1. So B 7 will 
intend to lend for all P7 in the support of SfN. 
What happens at the transition points between the equilibrium strategies 
has been left unstated. For instance, it has not yet been specified how Bs 
would respond to a renege when g takes the value where S{'B = S!(N = 1. 
This omission is intentional. These transition points will be used to construct 
the strategies for period six. For now, just note that the strategies put forth 
are only valid away from the transition points. 
Transition points aside, that completes the mapping from beliefs to strate-
gies for period seven. One important thing to keep in mind is that the only 
equilibrium in which B7 is indifferent is when x7 plays s{'B and p7 satis-
fies (A.8). Table A.2 summarizes this mapping. In addition, it introduces 
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Table A.2: X 7 and B7's Equilibrium Strategies 
p7 p7 
lower upper 57 £7 E1r7[57, £7] 
0 ~ eZ2)( uz14 eZ2) 57= 0 £7 = 0 E1r7[0, 0] (1-c)(3/14) 
{cL2HnL14-cL22 {nL 14}{11L14-cL22 5 PB £7 = 0 E1r7[Sf8 , OJ (1-e)(3/14) (1-e/2)(1-e) 7 
{11L14}{11L14-cL22 uL14- cL2 5 PB £7 = 1 E7r7[5f8 , 1] (1-c/2)(1-c) 1-E 7 
11Ll4-cL2 {llLl4-cL2}{1-eL2} 5 RN £7 = 1 E1r7[5fN, 1] 1-E (1-c)ll/14 7 
{ 11 Ll4 -eL2){1-eL2) 1 57= 0 £7 = 1 E1r7[0, 1] {l-e}11Ll4 
some shorthand to be used in the development of period six strategies. Let 
E7r7[57, £ 7] be the a priori expected payoff to X 7 from having a P7 such that 
her strategy is 57 and B7 's strategy is £ 7 . 
(1-E/2){10 + (1-E/2)10 + (E/2)[(1- E/2)150 + (E/2)60]} 
+(E/2){(1- E/2)150 + (E/2)60 + (1- E/2)10 
+(E/2)[(1- E/2)150 + (E/2)60]} 
20 + 140E - 45E2 
(1- E/2){10 + (1- E/2)10 + (E/2)[(1- E/2)150 + (E/2)60]} 
+(E/2){150 + (1- E/2)10 + (E/2)[(1- E/2)150 + (E/2)60]} 
20 + 140E - (45/2)E2 
(E/2){10 + (1- E/2)10 + (E/2)[(1- E/2)150 + (E/2)60]} 




Pi8 and PlN lead to B 7 being indifferent as specified in (A.8). 
Solving for the 56 that allows P.{'8 to satisfy (A.8) results in 5{8 . 
5 PB = 1 _ (1- E/2)[(11/14)(11/14- E/2) - (1- E/2)(1- E)P6J (A.10) 6 (11/14)(1- ?6)(11/14- E/2)(1 -E) 
It is easy to show that 0 ::=; 5{8 ::=; 1 for P6 satisfying 
(E/2)(11/14)(11/14- E/2) < P, < (11/14)(11/14- E/2) 
(1- E)[(1- E/2)2 - (11/14)(11/14- E/2)J - 6 - (1- E)(l- E/2) 
To determine the strategy to be played by B 7 to support this, consider the 
payoffs x6 will expect from either of her two action choices. If x6 reneges 
under 5{8 , B 7 will not want to lend according to Theorem 1.3.1. PlN can 
take on values such that if B 7 does accidentally lend, X 7 should either play 
57 = 0 or 5!( 8 . To determine for what values of P6 this will be the case, 
consider P7RN knowing that 5{
8 was the equilibrium strategy in period six. 
Given that 56 is known, PlN is only a function of P6 and E. The P6 such 
that PlN is the lower bound of the support of 5!(8 can be shown to be 
R = (11/14)(11/14- E/2) 
6 (1- E)[(1- E/2)2 + (11/14)(11/14- E/2)J. (A.11) 
For E < 3/7, this p6 is in the interval of p6 for which 5{8 E [0, 1J. So a 
renege from 5{8 can lead to either E1r7 [0, OJ or E7r7 [5!( 8 , OJ. For any P6 for 
which 5{8 is valid, a repayment will lead to 5/(8 . 
Let £:8 •0 be the probability that B 7 will grant a loan following a re-
nege, given that X 6 is playing 5{8 and would play 57=0 if a loan were 
granted following a renege. This is found by setting the expected pay-
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off to reneging, 150 + E1r7 [0, 0], equal to the expected payoff to repaying, 
60 + LPB,o E1r [SPB 1] + (1- LPB,o)E1r [SPB 0] The LPB,o that satisfies this 7 77, 7 77,. 7 
condition is 
LfB,o = 9(1- c/2)
2
. 
14(1 - t) 
(A.12) 
Similarly, let LfB,PB be the probability that B7 will lend following a 
renege, given that X6 is following StB and would play SfB if a loan were 
granted following a renege. The expected payoff to reneging is now 150 + 
E1r7[Sf8 , 0] and the payoff to repaying is 60 + LfB,PB E1r7[Sf8 , 1] + (1-
LfB,PB)E7r7[Sf8 , 0]. Equating these two expected payoffs results in 
LPB,PB- 9 
7 
- 14(1- t) 
(A.13) 
To solve for s:N ' find the s6 that will make p7RN satisfy (A.8). The 
unique S 6 that satisfies this condition is 
SRN _ 
1 
(c/2)[(11/14)(11/14- c/2)- (1- c)(1- c/2)?6] 
6 - + (11/14)(1- ? 6)(11/14- E/2)(1- E) · 
(A.14) 
This is valid for P6 satisfying 
(11/14)(11/14- c/2) P. (11/14)(11/14- c/2)(1- c/2) 
(1- c)(1- E/2) ::; 6::; (1- c)[(c/2)(1- c/2) + (11/14)(11/14- c/2)]. 
Once again, the lower bound here is the upper bound on beliefs for which 
stB is valid. Both strategies have x6 strictly intending to repay at this 
transition point. It will turn out that for a certain range of beliefs toward 
the high end of this range, no mixed strategy by B 7 will make X 6 indifferent 
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between reneging and repaying. 
When solving for B 7 's response to a repayment under Sf 8 , it first had to 
be specified what would happen in case of a renege. Now that a strategy that 
will make B 7 indifferent following a renege is under consideration, it must 
first be determined what happens following a repayment. Remembering that 
bankers cannot update beliefs if both X- and Y-types are strictly repaying, 
a quick glance at Figure 1.1 shows that a repayment can lead to S(8 . If 
no updating happens at the apex of S6 , then a repayment would certainly 
imply 5(8 , and Pf8 is COntinUOUS in 56, SO 5(8 is a possibility. lt is also 
clear that Sf,iN could also be played following a renege. Solving for the P6 
such that Pf8 is equal to the transition point from 5(8 to S!(N results in 
the following 
(11/14)(11/14- E/2) p6 = ------~~~~~----~~~~ 
(1- €)[11/14 + (3/28)€- (7 /28)€2]. (A.15) 
Consistent with the intuition from Figure 1.1 , it can be shown that for E < 
3/7, this is in the range of P6 for which Sf!N E [0, 1]. 
First consider the case where a repayment under Sf!N would lead to S(8 . 
Theorem 1.3.1 implies that since B 7 is indifferent following a renege, he must 
prefer to lend following a repayment for s:;N < 1. Once again, discussion 
of equilibrium at the transition point will be postponed. Repayment carries 
the expected payoff of 60 + E1r[S(8 , 1]. Let L:N,PB be the probability with 
which B 7 intends to lend following a renege by X 6 , who is playing Sf!N and 
who will play S!(8 if a loan is granted after repayment. The expected payoff 
to reneging is 150 + L:N,PB E1r7 [S!(8 , 1] + (1- L:N,P8 )E1r7 [S!(8 , 0]. Making 
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x6 indifferent requires the following L~N,P B. 
L RN,PB _ 5/14- c 7 -
1-c 
(A.16) 
If repayment leads to S!(N, then the expected payoff to repaying is 
60 + E1r7 [S!(N , 1] and from reneging is 150 + L~N,RN E1r7 [S,f8 , 1] + (1 -
L~N,RN)E?r7 [S.f8 , 0] . Solving for L~N,RN results in 
L RN,RN _ 20 - 56c + 9c2 
7 
- 28(1- c) 
(A.17) 
One further possibility is that repayment will push beliefs so high that 
X 7 can strictly renege and still expect B 8 to lend. It will quickly be shown 
that no £ 7 E [0, 1] can support S!(N for such a case. This is the case for 
11(11- 7c) 
p6 > ------~----~------
121- 23c- 147c2 + 49c3 · 
This P6 is in the support of Sf-N . Once again, the expected payoff to reneging 
is 150+ L7E1r7 [S,f8 , 1] + (1- £ 7 )E1r7 [S,f8 , OJ, while X 6 would expect a payoff 
of 60 + E1r7 [0 , 1] from repayment. Solving for £ 7 results in 
L _ 38 - 65c + 9c2 
7
- 28(1- c) ' 
(A.18) 
which is greater than one for c < .291 , which is the range of c over which 
L:s was valid. So this implies that there must be some other equilibrium 
strategy in this range of beliefs. Since B 7 is indifferent in this range only 
when X6 reneges under Sf-N and P7RN is increasing in 56, a pure strategy to 
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renege would lead one to not expect a loan in period seven. However, if the 
equilibrium were 56 = 0, since P.f'8 is decreasing in 56 , a repayment would 
still push beliefs so high that X 7 would be able to renege and still get a loan 
in period eight. The payoff to repaying is far greater for the range of E being 
considered, so X 6 would deviate from 56 = 0 for these beliefs. Theorem 1.3.3 
shows that 56 = 1 can only be an equilibrium for E > 0 if B 7 is indifferent 
following a renege or repayment (remember, for St = 1 P/~f = P{+f = Pt)· 
But the only strategy that makes B 7 indifferent following repayment is S[
8 
which is greater than one for this set of beliefs. So no pure strategy can be 
an equilibrium in this range, nor can any mixed strategy that depends on 
the indifference of B7 be supported. 
It was mentioned earlier that the transition points between strategies 
would play an important role. That role will now be described. Consider 
first the ?7 for which Sf!N = 0. X1 has a pure strategy to renege, but 
reneging will lead to B 8 being indifferent. So B 8 can play any mixed strategy 
as long as X 7 still prefers reneging to repaying. Consider a strategy, S/00 , 
such that P.f'8 implies s!(N = 0. Solving for this strategy gives 
SJOG _ (E/2)[(1- E)P6- 11/14 + E/2] 
6 
- (1 - E)(11/14- E/2)(1 - P6) 
(A.19) 
By construction, the probability of repaying under this strategy equals the 
probability of repaying under st;N at the point where st;N fails. A certain 
amount of path dependence must must be introduced to support this. If X 6 
reneges while following this strategy, it can be shown that P7RN will be such 
that B 7 intends to lend and X 7 plays Sf( 8 . The expected payoff to reneging 
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is 150 + E1r7 [S{8 , 1] . When X 6 repays under this strategy, B 7 would clearly 
intend to lend, and S7 = 0. Following a renege by X 7 , B 8 would be indifferent 
and could mix such that X 6 is indifferent and X 7 weakly prefers to renege. 
Let L~oG,6 be Bs's mixed strategy that supports Sf0 G. Then X6's expected 
payoff to repaying is 
E1r6 [PBJSi
0
G] = 60+(1- c/2)((1- c/2){150 + [(1- c)Li0 G + c/2] 
[(1- c/2)150 + (c/2)60] + [(1- c)(1- Lf0 G •6) + c/2]10} 
+(c/2)60 + (1- c/2)[(1- c/2)150 + (c/2)60] + (c/2)10) 
+(c/2){10 + (1- c/2)[(1- c/2)150 + (c/2)60] + (c/2)10} 
Solving for Lf0 G '6 produces 
JOG 6 72 - 76£ + 158£2 - 73£3 + 9c4 
Ls ' = _4_(_1 __ -c-/2_)_2 (-1---c-) ..,.-( 2-8---9-c.,----) · (A.20) 
For all c E [0 , 1], this will satisfy the condition that X 7 will prefer to renege 
after repaying in period six. 
P.fN is increasing in both p6 and s6, and staG is increasing in P6, so it 
may be the case that a renege under staG would lead to st,m. This is true 
for 
P. 11/14- c/2 
6 > (1- c)(ll/14 + c/2) · 
(A.21) 
So the expected payoff to reneging would be 150+E7r7[S.fN, 1]. The expected 




_ 112- 188E + 194E2 - 73E3 + 9E4 
s-
4(1- E/2)(28- 37E + 9E2 ) (A.22) 
This can easily be shown to be greater than one for all E E [0, 1], so Sf0 G 
fails at the P6 given in (A.21). 
The value of P6 given by (A.21) has an interesting characteristic. If X-
types' mixed strategies are written as functions of beliefs, then at this partic-
ular belief Sf0 G[P6 ] = SfN[P6 ]. This can be seen graphically in Figure 1.1. 
The point at which Sf0 G intersects SfN is exactly the belief at which a re-
nege would lead to SfN. This turns out to be less than coincidental. If SfN 
is used as a mapping from beliefs in period six to probabilities of repaying 
in period six, p.fN would be such that s7 = sr B = SfN = 1 and B7 would 
intend to lend. Once again , X 6 's mixed strategy in period six cannot be 
supported by B 7 , but it can be supported by B 8 . If X 6 reneges and then gets 
a loan, B 8 will be indifferent regardless of what X 7 does. B 8 must mix such 
that x6 is indifferent and x7 weakly prefers to repay. 
The functional form for this strategy which shall be called s:N·7 is already 
known; just replace P7 with P6 in SfN to get 
s:N,7 = 1 + (E/2)[11/14- E/2- (1 - E)P6] 
(1 - ?6)(11/14 - E/2)(1- E) . 
(A.23) 
Since B 8 would be indifferent following a renege, a repayment or even 
a refused loan, it would be possible to have him mix in response to any of 
these actions. Notation becomes somewhat tricky here, because of the path 
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dependence of B8 's strategy. Let Lf8 [Sim'
7
] be B8 's probability of lending 
given that X 6 reneged under s:N·7 and repaid in period seven. L:N[s:N·7 ] 
and L~L[s:N·7] where N L stands for "no loan" are defined similarly. There 
is some latitude in picking these strategies because they only need to satisfy 
one equation and one weak inequality. Two somewhat arbitrary rules will 
be employed to help in the selection of these strategies. To take care of the 
case where B 8 is indifferent after B 7 did not lend, B 8 will just respond to 
the entrepreneur's previous move. In this case, B8 is indifferent only after 
a renege by X 6 , so following no loan in period seven, B 8 would lend with 
the same probability as if X 7 had reneged. The second rule says that if X6 
reneges and B 7 lends, B 8 will mix such that X 7 will be indifferent between 
reneging and repaying. This need not be the case; it is only required that X1 
weakly prefers repaying, which this rule will satisfy. This particular selection 
also preserves the weak monotonicity of X-types' expected payoffs in beliefs, 
for both periods six and seven. 
The easiest equation to satisfy with these strategies is 
which corresponds to my first assumption about the strategies. The sec-
ond equation is the indifference between repaying and reneging in period 
seven given a renege in period six. Let En7 [P BIS:N·
7
] be the expected pay-
off from successfully repaying in period seven along this path, and define 
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E1r7[PBIS:N,7] = 60+{(1- c)Lf8 [s:N·7] + c/2}[(1- c/2)150 + (c/2)60] 
+{(1- c)(1- Lf8 [s:N·7 ]) + c/2}10 
150 + {(1- c)L:N[s:N·7] + c/2}[(1- c/2)150 + (c/2)60] 
+{(1- c)(1- L:N[s:N·7]) + c/2}10 
Finally, X 6 must be made indifferent between repaying and reneging. Let 
E1r6[P BIS:N·
7] and E1r6[RNIS:N,
7] be the expected payoffs along this path 
in period six. 
E1r6[P BIS:N'7] 
E1r6[RNIS:N,7] 
60 + E1r7 [0, 1] 
150 + (1- c/2)E7r7 [P BIS:N·
7] 
+(c/2)[(1- c)LrL[s:N·7][(1- c/2)150 + (c/2)60] 
[(1- c)(1- LrL[s:N·7])10] 
This is a set of three linear equations in three unknowns. The unique 





10- 37€ + 9c2 
(1- c)(28- 9c) 
L:N[s:N,7l 
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For p6 higher than those for which s:N,? is positive, x6 should strictly 
renege. For any beliefs in this range, a repayment should imply an expected 
payoff for periods seven and eight of E1r7 [0, 1]. When P6 is toward the lower 
end of this range, a renege will imply s!(N. It is clear to see that this has 
a higher expectation. A repayment in period six gives X 6 a certain 60 and 
two payoffs of 150 that are subject to error. A renege makes one of the 150's 
certain, and subjects a 60 and a 150 to error. Reneging in period six clearly 
yields a better payoff. For some very high values of P6 , it is the case that 
P7RN will imply an expected payoff for the final two periods of E1r7 [0, 1]. This 
clearly is better than repayment in period six. 
Similarly, for very low values of P6 , X 6 should also intend to renege. For 
some P6 in this range below the support of S[B , a repayment would imply 
an expected payoff in the last two periods of E1r7 [S.fB, 0], but it is better 
to take the sure renege in period six than to hope for an accidental loan in 
period seven. 
Much the same as in period seven, it can be shown that the only strategy 
for X 6 under which B 6 is indifferent is S[B. The belief that causes that 
indifference will be calculated here, but the lack of indifference for all of the 
other strategies will not be shown. 
Consider once again the general indifference condition of bankers given 
in (1.4): 
Substituting s[s for S6 and simplifying gives the following expression for P6 
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at which B6 is indifferent: 
(11/14)2(11/14- c/2) 
P6 = (1 - c/2) 2(1- c) · 
Table A.3 summarizes the mapping of P6 to X-type strategies and ex-
pected payoffs, as well as B6 's strategies. 
The expected payoffs for period six in terms of period seven's expected 
payoffs are given below. E1r6[0 , 0] = (1- c/2){10 + E1r7[0, 0]} + (c/2){150 + 
E1r1[0 , 0]} 
E1r6[(S{8 , S7 = 0) , OJ = (1- c/2){10 + E1r7[0, 0]} + (c/2){150 + E1r7[0, 0]} 
E1r6[(S{8 , S.f8 ), OJ = (1- c/2){10 + E1r7[0 , 0]} + (c/2){150 + E1r1[S.f8 , 0]} 
E1r6[(St'N, S.f8 ), 1] = (1- c/2){60 + E1r7[S,f8 , 1]} + (c/2){10 + E1r1[S.f8 , 1]} 
E1r6[(St'N, S.f-N) , 1] = (1- c/2){60 + E1r7[S.f-N , 1]} + (c/2){10 + E1r7[S.f-N, 1]} 
E1r6[Sf0 G, 1] = (1- c/2){150 + E1r7[S,f8 , 1]} + (c/2){10 + E1r7[S.f-N, 1]} 
E1r6[S:N·
7, 1] = (1- c/2){60 + E1r7[0, 1]} + (c/2){10 + E1r1[S.f'N, 1]} 
E1r6[(S6 = 0, SfN), 1] = (1- c/2){150 + E1r7[SfN , 1]} + (c/2){10+ E1r7[0, 1]} 
E1r6[(S6 = 0, S7 = 0), 1] = (1- c/2){150 + E1r7[0, 1]} + (c/2){10 + E1r7[0, 1]} 
It is clear to see why this appendix is limited to a partial derivation of 
the equilibrium. Even for this simple error process, solving for the closed 
form solution of the equilibrium quickly becomes quite complicated, both 
notationally and computationally. The most interesting characteristics of 
this equilibrium derivation are flushed out in this appendix. What is omitted 
is merely a matter of computation. 
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